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California Supreme Court Survey
September 1987-October 1987
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the reader of the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researching any of the topical areas. The decisions are ana-
lyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.
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I. CIVIL PROCEDURE
Section 5124 of the California Civil Code, which
authorizes courts to reopen marital dissolution
judgments between military and non-military spouses,
entered during a period prior to federal legislation but
subsequent to binding judicial decisions, is not
unconstitutional as violative of due process, nor does it
violate constitutional prohibitions against impairment of
contract: In re Marriage of Barnes.
In In re Marriage of Barnes, 43 Cal. 3d 1371, 743 P.2d 915, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 855 (1987), the court considered the constitutional viability of
state legislation which authorizes courts to reopen marital dissolution
judgments entered between June 26, 1981, and January 31, 1983. This
corrective window period was intended by the legislature to serve as
a remedy for former spouses of military personnel previously bound
by the mandate of the Supreme Court in McCarty v. McCarty, 453
U.S. 210 (1981), which determined that military retirement benefits
were the separate property of the military spouse and could not be
treated as community property under state law. Prior to McCarty, it
was well settled California law that such benefits were community
property. See In re Marriage of Milhan, 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812,
166 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980).
However, the effect of McCarty was negated by federal legislation
enacted in September of 1982. The Federal Uniformed Services For-
mer Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1408 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter FUSFSPA], provides that a court may treat retirement benefits
payable to a member of the uniformed services as community prop-
erty under state law and, subject to certain restrictions, allows appli-
cation retroactive to June 25, 1981. The Act became effective
February 1, 1983.
The case at bar involved a divorce judgment rendered final on
April 15, 1982, during the anomalous period between the McCarty de-
cision and FUSFSPA's effective date. Although appellate courts in-
terpreted FUSFSPA as a renunciation of McCarty by holding that
Congress intended retroactive application to divorce cases in which
an appeal was pending when FUSFSPA became effective, there were
spouses whose judgments had become final between those dates. To
compensate for this disparate treatment, these spouses were given
special permission by the California Legislature to seek a modifica-
tion of judgment for those "military retirement benefits payable on
or after February 1, 1983. . . ." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5124 (repealed by
Stats. 1983, c. 775, § 1, operative January 1, 1986)(West 1983)).
Barnes involved post-dissolution proceedings begun in February
1984. The wife moved, under authority of section 5124, for a modifi-
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cation of judgment, requesting the court to include division of her
former husband's military retirement benefits. The motion was de-
nied by the trial court, which held section 5124 to be unconstitu-
tional. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that since Congress
had not expressly invalidated McCarty retroactively, section 5124 vio-
lated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
Barnes, 43 Cal. 3d at 1375-76, 743 P.2d at 917, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
Justice Panelli, writing for a unanimous court, reversed, holding
the reasoning of the lower court to be "untenable." Id. at 1376, 743
P.2d at 917, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 857. The supreme court deemed it clear
that Congress meant FUSFSPA to operate retroactively, agreeing
with the analysis developed in In re Marriage of Doud, 181 Cal. App.
3d 510, 226 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1986). The court of appeal in Doud con-
cluded that FUSFSPA was intended to remove the federal preemp-
tion of McCarty, thereby reviving preexisting California community
property law. Because the enactment of FUSFSPA reinstated local
authority, the change in California's law defining finality of judgment
(section 5124) was a valid exercise of power by the state legislature.
The only limitations upon that authority are the federal and state
constitutions.
The court evaluated the merit of such constitutional constraints
and found that section 5124 was not in violation of the due process
clause: the compelling state interest in remedying "rank injustice"
justifies a deprivation of the individual husband's vested property
rights. For the same reasons, such legislative action does not repre-
sent a constitutional violation of the contract clause. Finally, the
court noted that the husband's interests were protected because the
trial court remained bound to its obligation to do equity on remand.
Accordingly, the judgment was reversed.
Though undoubtedly of utmost importance to the actual parties
and participants in this proceeding, this decision will likely have little
effect on the evolution of family law or on the divorce bar in general.
Narrow in its facts, and premised on a specifically tailored state law
which has already expired by its own terms, In re Marriage of Barnes
offers to the reader an interesting historical note involving the ten-
sion between federal and state powers.
TRAVIS P. CLARDY
447 .
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. For purposes of article IV, section 10 of the California
Constitution, the Governor may not veto a substantive
section of a bill, even if that section requires the
expenditure of treasury funds. For purposes of article
IV, section 9 of the California Constitution, the
Legislature may not enact a statute which comprises a
topic of excessive generality: Harbor v. Deukmejian.
In Harbor v. Deukmejian, 43 Cal. 3d 1078, 742 P.2d 1290, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 569 (1987), the California Supreme Court addressed two issues
of constitutional significance. The first related to the Governor's
power to veto legislation under article IV, section 10 of the California
Constitution [hereinafter section 10]. The second related to the Leg-
islature's ability to promulgate a statute and its title under article IV,
section 9 of the California Constitution [hereinafter section 9].
The Legislature had enacted a budget for the 1984-1985 fiscal year
[hereinafter Budget Act] which included an appropriation for aid to
families with dependent children [hereinafter AFDC]. Ten days
later, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1379 [hereinafter Bill
1379] which provided "necessary statutory adjustments to imple-
ment" the Budget Act. Section 45.5 of Bill 1379 amended section
11056 of the Welfare and Institutions Code by permitting AFDC ben-
efits to be paid from the application date for the benefits, instead of
the processing date. The Governor, during the budget review pro-
cess, reduced the AFDC appropriation. In approving Bill 1379, the
Governor purported to veto section 45.5 to conform to his action on
the AFDC allotment. (The amount reduced in the AFDC allotment
corresponded to the amount required to support the section 45.5
program.)
The petitioners included three individuals who had applied for
AFDC grants and a coalition of welfare rights organizations. The
Governor, the Director of the State Department of Social Services,
and the Department of Finance and its Director were joined as
respondents.
The court held that the Governor's purported veto of section 45.5
was not justified under section 10 because section 45.5 was neither an
item of appropriation nor a separate bill. The court further held that
Bill 1379 violated the single subject rule of section 9.
Under the California Constitution, the Governor may approve a
bill and still reduce or eliminate one or more items of appropriation
within that bill, or he may veto a bill in its entirety. CAL. CONST. art.
IV, § 10(b). See also 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Constitutional Law § 97 (8th ed. 1974); 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes §§ 43,
46 (1980). The court rejected the respondents' argument that the
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Governor's veto of section 45.5 was proper since it was in reality part
of an "item of appropriation." The respondents claimed that the Leg-
islature had attempted to evade a veto by placing the appropriation in
the Budget Act and its purpose in section 45.5 of Bill 1379. The court
noted that section 45.5 did not fit under any case law definition of the
term "item of appropriation." See Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice,
299 U.S. 410, 413 (1937); Wood v. Riley, 192 Cal. 293, 303, 219 P. 966,
970-71 (1923). Section 45.5 did not provide funds for claims payments,
additional monies to existing funds, or make any allotment from the
public treasury. The court held that the effect of the section was sub-
stantive in that it provided for a governmental department to act in a
specified way. This effect was not altered by the fact that the direc-
tion would require the expenditure of funds from the treasury.
The court summarily rejected the respondents' further contention
that section 45.5 was a separate subject within Bill 1379 and thus a
"bill" for the purpose of the Governor's veto. The court noted that
the term "bill" is not synonymous with "subject." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 149, 1277-78 (5th ed. 1979). Further, the court found that if
it accepted the respondents' argument, the Governor would have the
ability to decide whether portions of a substantive bill constituted
separate subjects vulnerable to his veto. This would lead to continual
conflict between the Governor and the Legislature as to whether the
veto power had been exceeded.
The court next turned to the question of the validity of Bill 1379.
Under the California Constitution, a statute "shall embrace but one
subject, which shall be expressed in its title." CAL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 9; see also 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitu-
tional Law §§ 71, 73 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984). The court rejected
the petitioners' claim that a statute with multiple subjects complied
with section 9 as long as those subjects were included within the title.
The court stated that the two aspects of section 9 were independent
of each other because they had separate purposes. Any statutory pro-
vision had to meet both of the requirements.
The court recognized that the single subject rule had been ac-
corded liberal construction. Evans v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 58, 62-
63, 8 P.2d 467, 469 (1932). However, this rule did not sanction a join-
ing of disparate provisions which were related only because they per-
tained to topics of excessive generality. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal.
3d 236, 253, 651 P.2d 274, 284, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 40 (1982). The peti-
tioners claimed that the subject of Bill 1379 was "fiscal affairs" be-
cause the object of Bill 1379 was to make statutory adjustments to
implement the Budget Act. The court concluded that both "fiscal af-
fairs" and "statutory adjustments" were overly broad because they
included any substantive measure affecting budgetary matters.
Therefore, Bill 1379 was invalid as a violation of section 9.
The court went on to hold that its determinations in this case were
to be applied prospectively. Otherwise, a substantial number of prior
budget implementation bills would be subject to challenge. Further,
had section 45.5 been passed as a separate enactment, the Governor
would have had veto power. His power was, however, unlawfully
curtailed by the Legislature's behavior in passing a multi-subject bill.
Thus, the Governor's veto of section 45.5 was valid.
The court declared that its decision benefited the general public by
more clearly defining the Governor's veto power and by reiterating
the importance of the single-subject rule. These were the very rea-
sons noted by the court in awarding the petitioners attorney fees
under the private attorney general doctrine. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1021.5 (West 1980). However, as also noted by the court, this hold-
ing does not constitute a new rule of law. Thus, its major impact is to
serve as an elaboration and endorsement of previous interpretation
in this area.
STAFF
B. Sobriety checkpoints, conducted within certain
guidelines, are not in violation of motorists' state and
federal constitutional rights: Ingersoll v. Palmer.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ingersoll v. Palmer,' the court held that the operation of sobri-
ety checkpoints, subject to certain limitations, was not a violation of
motorists' constitutional rights.2 First, the court stated that the ap-
propriate test to be applied was not the test normally applied to a
stop or detention situation, requiring an individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing. Rather, the court determined that the appropriate stan-
dard should be that applied to "investigative detentions and inspec-
tions conducted as part of a regulatory scheme in furtherance of an
administrative purpose," 3 because the primary purpose of the check-
points was to deter driving while intoxicated as opposed to discover-
1. 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987). Justice Kaufman wrote
the majority opinion with Justices Lucas, Arguelles and Eagleson concurring. Justice
Broussard wrote a separate dissenting opinion with which Justices Mosk and Panelli
concurred.
2. The primary concern was whether the roadblocks were in violation of motor-
ists' rights under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I of the California Constitution.
3. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1328, 743 P.2d at 1304, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
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ing or preserving evidence. The court concluded that the
governmental interests involved and the extent to which the sobriety
checkpoints advanced those interests outweighed the interference
with the individual rights of motorists caused by the checkpoints.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case concerned suits filed by taxpayers against the chiefs of
police of several California cities to prohibit the operation of sobriety
checkpoints. Subsequent to a November 1984 opinion by the Califor-
nia Attorney General, stating that roadblocks set up in order to de-
tect and apprehend intoxicated drivers could be operated without
violating the state or federal constitution,4 the Burlingame Police De-
partment established the first sobriety checkpoint program in Cali-
fornia.5 The checkpoint was conceived and operated pursuant to the
guidelines set forth in the Attorney General's opinion. The depart-
ment issued a detailed manual describing how the checkpoints were
to be operated, as well as discussing legal considerations, cost analy-
sis, location selection, personnel and equipment requirements, per-
sonnel training and selection, publicity, and program evaluation.
Shortly thereafter, Ingersoll filed a petition in the California
Supreme Court for a writ of mandate, asking that the operation of
the sobriety checkpoints be prohibited. The supreme court trans-
ferred the matter to the First District Court of Appeal which found
the checkpoints, when operated under certain guidelines, to be con-
stitutional under the federal and state constitutions. The supreme
court granted review.
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Applicable Standard of Review
The petitioners first argued that the constitutionality of the sobri-
ety checkpoints should be determined under the standards set forth
in In Re Tony C.,6 concerning traditional criminal investigative stops.
In order for a detention to satisfy state and federal constitutional lim-
itations under Tony C., there must exist a reasonable individualized
4. 67 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 471 (1984).
5. The Burlingame program was intended to operate as a model for other munici-
palities to follow; therefore, the court used it for purposes of constitutional evaluation.
Sobriety checkpoint programs were established shortly after the Burlingame project
by various other local governments as well as the California Highway Patrol.
6. 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
suspicion of wrongdoing.7 The court declined to accept this view,
finding the sobriety checkpoints analogous to the airport screening
searches discussed in People v. Hyde.8 In Hyde, the majority adopted
a standard which balances the governmental interests and the effec-
tiveness of the methods used against the resulting interference with
personal liberties. This balancing test was first applied by the United
States Supreme Court to administrative searches which are part of a
regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose. 9
The primary requirement under the Hyde test is that the seizure
be "'carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limi-
tations on the conduct of individual officers.'"10 In Hyde, the
searches took the form of a standard criminal search. However, the
administrative search standards were applied because the primary
purpose was to further an administrative interest. The concurring
minority agreed with the test used, but disagreed with the classifica-
tion of the search as administrative." Upholding the constitutional-
ity of the searches, the court focused on the strong governmental
interests involved, the ability to avoid the searches, the unavailability
of any effective warrant procedure, the neutrality of application, and
the low level of intrusiveness. 12
Confirming the Hyde rationale, the present court found the sobri-
ety checkpoints analogous to airport searches, pointing out that the
primary purpose of the checkpoints was to promote public safety by
deterring motorists from drinking before driving.13 The court justi-
fied its approach under the Tony C decision, recognizing that certain
situations may not require the safeguards provided by the test appro-
priate for traditional criminal investigative searches.14 The court be-
lieved that although the checkpoints would result in the arrest of
some individuals engaged in criminal conduct, the overriding purpose
of the program was to deter drunk driving and reduce the threat it
poses to the community, thereby distinguishing the situation from
other investigative roadblocks found to be unconstitutional.'5
7. Id. at 893, 582 P.2d at 959, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
8. 12 Cal. 3d 158, 524 P.2d 830, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1974).
9. Id. at 165-66, 524 P.2d at 835, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
10. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1329, 743 P.2d at 1304, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 48 (quoting
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979)).
11. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d at 170, 524 P.2d at 837, 115 Cal. Rptr.. at 365 (Wright, C.J.,
concurring).
12. Id.
13. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1331-32, 743 P.2d at 1305-06, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
14. Tony C, 21 Cal. 3d at 895, 582 P.2d at 962, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
15. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1335, 743 P.2d at 1309, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 52; see also Peo-
ple v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956) (striking down police investigative road-
blocks set up in order to search for anything that looked 'suspicious); Wirin v. Horrall,
85 Cal. App. 2d 497, 193 P.2d 470 (1948) (invalidating police investigative roadblocks set
up in order to search for anything illegal).
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B. Analysis Under the Administrative Purpose Test
After reviewing a number of federal decisions concerning similar
issues,16 the court examined the Burlingame sobriety checkpoints.
The court discussed the severe danger posed by drunk drivers and
the alarming amount of damage resulting from drug and alcohol re-
lated traffic accidents; thereafter, the court recognized the compel-
ling state interest in combatting the problem. 17 The court then
moved to the operation of the checkpoints.
Under the Burlingame project, checkpoints were publicized in ad-
vance, stressing the severity of the drunk driving problem and gener-
ally warning of the dangers of driving while intoxicated. Leaflets
were distributed to those stopped, explaining the checkpoints, and
survey cards were also distributed. Signs warning of the roadblocks
were posted in such a way as to make it possible for motorists to
avoid them, and motorists were not to be stopped merely for choosing
to do so. In a detailed manual, issued to govern the operation of the
checkpoints, the primary purposes of the project were stated to be
public education and deterrence. The manual also discussed the inef-
fectiveness of roving patrols and other measures previously taken.
The project was to be studied in order to evaluate its effectiveness.18
Although the Burlingame checkpoint studies identified only general
decreases in traffic, general decreases in bar business and other indi-
rect effects, the court also considered studies showing decreases in al-
cohol-related traffic accidents following the implementation of
sobriety checkpoint programs in other states.19
The court rejected the petitioners' argument that because roving
patrols result in twice as many drunk driving arrests, they are a more
16. The court supported its argument that certain detentions relating to adminis-
trative purposes are justified, notwithstanding the lack of individualized reasonable
suspicion, by noting similar decisions by the United States Supreme Court in Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307
(1978). Both Camara and Marshall dealt with warrantless building inspections. The
court also noted numerous federal decisions upholding the constitutionality of other
types of searches which do not require reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Bis-
well, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (firearm stores); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (wel-
fare recipient homes); Colonnade Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (liquor
industry); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (commercial premises).
17. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1338, 743 P.2d at 1311, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 54; see Burg v.
Municipal Court, 35 Cal. 3d 257, 262, 673 P.2d 732, 734, 198 Cal. Rptr. 145, 146-47 (1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 967 (1984).
18. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1326-27, 743 P.2d at 1302, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
19. Id. at 1337, 743 P.2d at 1310, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 53-54. The court considered the
findings of the test programs of Maryland and findings of the New York Governor's
Alcohol and Highway Safety Task Force.
effective method of enforcement. The court, stressing the deterrent
purpose of the checkpoints, stated that the reduced number of arrests
could indicate that the checkpoints were effective in reducing the
number of intoxicated drivers on the road.20 Furthermore, the court
felt the Burlingame studies could not accurately measure the pro-
ject's effectiveness unless the project was conducted on a long term
basis. The court did not feel it should prohibit a potentially effective
procedure because its effectiveness could not be immediately identi-
fied, particularly when the limited evidence available appeared to
support the project's effectiveness.2 1
The court stated that the checkpoints may be more effective than
roving patrols because they do not require reasonable suspicion, a re-
quirement normally satisfied only by observance of behavior objec-
tively indicating impairment. 22 This increased efficacy would apply
to situations where motorists have blood alcohol levels above that
which is legally permissible, but show no outward signs of impair-
ment. As a result, the court found the sobriety checkpoints to be at
least potentially more effective than alternative methods such as in-
creased police patrols and stiffer criminal penalties.23
Finally, the court considered the level of intrusion on personal lib-
erties resulting from the checkpoints. While recognizing that the in-
trusion was "not trivial," the court felt the control of supervisory law
enforcement personnel, lack of individual officer discretion, safety
provisions, controls on time and duration of operation, limited length
of detention, advance publicity, and steps taken to indicate the offi-
cial nature of the roadblocks minimized the intrusiveness of the
checkpoints as much as possible.24 Balancing the resulting intrusions
against the state's interest in battling the menace posed by drunk
driving and the deterrent value of the sobriety checkpoints, the court
found the measure reasonable and not a violation of motorists' state
or federal constitutional rights.2 5
C Statutory Authority for Sobriety Checkpoints
The petitioners' final argument challenged the power of the law
enforcement agencies to establish sobriety checkpoints absent legisla-
tive authorization. Petitioners contended first, that the police are
limited to enforcing traffic laws by means explicitly set forth by stat-
20. The court stated that "[i]f the checkpoint is properly serving its function-de-
terrence-it may result in no arrests at all." Id. at 1339, 743 P.2d at 1311, 241 Cal. Rptr.
at 55.
21. Id. at 1340-41, 743 P.2d at 1312-13, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 55-56.
22. Id. at 1340, 743 P.2d at 1312, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
23. Id. at 1341, 743 P.2d at 1312-13, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 56.
24. Id. at 1341-47, 743 P.2d at 1313-17, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 56-61.
25. Id. at 1347, 743 P.2d at 1317, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
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ute; second, that roadblocks operated without state supervision are
contrary to the legislative intent of providing uniform state vehicle
rules; and third, that if the legislature intended to permit sobriety
roadblocks, it would have provided for them explicitly as it has in
other situations.2 6
The court dismissed the petitioners' arguments with respect to lack
of authority, finding no support for petitioners' contention that the
police are limited to enforcement methods expressly set forth by stat-
ute. 27 Rather, the court found the requisite authority to be implicit
in the general statutory grant of power to enforce criminal laws.2 8
The court also dismissed the argument that state traffic laws pre-
empt municipal regulation of temporary checkpoints,29 because tem-
porary roadblocks do not reach the level of regulating traffic under
the state vehicle codes.30 With regard to the petitioners' third argu-
ment, the court acknowledged that roadblocks were explicitly pro-
vided for by statute in certain situations,31 but declined to accept the
negative inference that the legislature by its silence intended to pro-
hibit their use in all other situations.32 In dictum, the court applied
the same reasoning to the petitioners' suggestion that legislative si-
lence was an indication that the legislature felt the constitutionality
of sobriety checkpoints was unquestionable. 33
IV. JUSTICE BROUSSARD'S DISSENTING OPINION
The dissent challenged the applicability of the Hyde rationale. Ac-
cording to Justice Broussard, a balancing test was applied in Hyde
not because the searches were primarily operated as a deterrent, but
because they were an integral part of a regulatory scheme in the fur-
26. Id.
27. The court considered the authority cited in support of petitioners' argument to
be unconvincing. The petitioners asserted that general police power to enforce the Ve-
hicle Code required reasonable suspicion of individualized wrongdoing unless other
methods are explicitly authorized by statute. In support of this assertion, petitioners
cited People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 41 Cal. Rptr. 290
(1964). However, the court viewed the case as an application of the standard stop or
detention test because the case focused on the application of the exclusionary rule. In-
gersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1347-48, 743 P.2d at 1317-18, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61.
28. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1348, 743 P.2d at 1318, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
29. Id. at 1343-44, 743 P.2d at 1314-15, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 58-59.
30. Id. at 1348-49, 743 P.2d at 1317-18, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 60-61.
31. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 2805 (vehicle registration inspections), 2806 (safety in-
spections), 2814 (mechanical inspections) (West 1987); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE
§ 5341 (border agricultural inspection stations) (West 1986).
32. Ingersoll, 43 Cal. 3d at 1349-50, 743 P.2d at 1318-19, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 61-62.
33. Id.
therance of an administrative purpose.34 No such scheme was pres-
ent with regard to the sobriety checkpoints. Justice Broussard went
on to say that even if the roadblocks have an indirect deterrent ef-
fect, the purpose of their operation is to detect and apprehend drunk
drivers.35 Furthermore, he stated that motorists are not so heavily
regulated that they could contemplate only a limited expectation of
privacy, as is the case with those engaged in activities involving such
things as liquor or firearms.36 The dissenting justices found no dif-
ference between sobriety checkpoints and detentions for other
crimes. 3 7
Finally, the dissent concluded that even assuming the applicability
of the balancing test, the majority overestimated the effectiveness of
the sobriety checkpoints, while underestimating the interference
with individual liberties. Although the government has a profound
interest in combatting the drunk driving problem, Justice Broussard
argued that intoxicated drivers are easier to detect than most others
who have committed a crime, and that the state's interest in enforc-
ing more serious criminal laws is at least as great. 38 The dissent also
viewed the evidence in support of the effectiveness of the roadblocks
as doubtful.3 9
Justice Broussard then pointed out that although the expectation
of privacy in an automobile is not as great as in the home, "motorists
do retain a reasonable expectation of considerable privacy in the au-
tomobile."40 Additionally, there is no state control of checkpoint op-
eration and little or no effective remedy for abuses. The dissent
urged that when these considerations are weighed in light of the
large number of innocent motorists affected, the governmental inter-
ests do not justify the interference with personal liberties inherent in
the operation of sobriety checkpoints.41
V. CONCLUSION
As the dissent recognized, the decision here results in a dangerous
expansion of governmental powers of law enforcement. The majority
states in its opinion that it is
illogical to suggest that an officer who has a reasonable suspicion an individual
is driving under the influence of intoxicants and thus endangering the public
may take corrective action, but that a law enforcement agency having knowl-
34. Id. at 1350-56, 743 P.2d at 1319-23, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 62-67 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1351, 743 P.2d at 1319, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
37. Id. at 1351-52, 743 P.2d at 1319-20, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 63-64.
38. Id. at 1353-54, 743 P.2d at 1321, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
39. Id. at 1353-56, 743 P.2d at 1321-23, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 64-67.
40. Id. at 1354-55, 743 P.2d at 1322, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
41. Id. at 1354-56, 743 P.2d at 1322-23, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 66-67.
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edge that on any given night hundreds of drivers will be under the influence
of intoxicants and thus endangering the public may not.
4 2
It is difficult to perceive a difference between the knowledge that
hundreds of drivers may be intoxicated on any given night and the
knowledge that hundreds of drivers on any given night may perpe-
trate a felony not related to consumption of alcohol. It can also be
argued that instituting police roadblocks to search for contraband or
other evidence of crime, which would clearly be unconstitutional ab-
sent particularized suspicion, would to some extent deter the com-
mission of any crime, since the likelihood of apprehension would be
much greater.
The majority's acceptance of form over substance in this opinion
makes a limitless number of police detentions arguably constitu-
tional, so long as the stated primary purpose is deterrence. For this
reason, it is important that the court limit Ingersoll at the earliest
opportunity.
ANTHONY J. ELLROD
C. The Robbins-McAlister Financial Responsibility Act,
which requires motorists to provide proof of
insurance, meets procedural due process and
delegation-of-power requirements; and the balance of
hardships favors the public interest: King v. Meese.
In King v. Meese, 43 Cal. 3d 1217, 743 P.2d 889, 240 Cal. Rptr. 829
(1987), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Robbins-McAlis-
ter Financial Responsibility Act of 1984 [hereinafter the Act], which
mandates proof of insurance for all California motorists. See 1984
Cal. Legis. Serv. 1322 (West) (codified in part at CAL. INS. CODE
§ 11580.11 (West Supp. 1987)). The court found that the Act provided
California motorists with adequate procedural due process and did
not improperly delegate authority to private insurers. The court con-
curred with the legislative finding that the public is substantially
harmed by uninsured drivers; thus, a "balancing of the hardships" fa-
vors the public-at-large, rather than those unable to obtain private
automobile insurance.
Under the Act, peace officers may request proof of financial re-
sponsibility whenever issuing a "notice to appear" or when sum-
moned to an accident scene. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 16028(c), (d)
42. Id. at 1348, 743 P.2d at 1318, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
(West Supp. 1987). Failure to provide proof is an infraction. See id.
§ 16028(a). If convicted, the driver must provide proof of financial re-
sponsibility within sixty days and maintain it for three years, or risk
suspension of her license. See id. § 16034; see also 7 AM. JUR. 2D Au-
tomobile Insurance §§ 20, 24 (1980 & Supp. 1987); 8 CAL. JUR. 3D
Automobiles § 167 (Supp. 1987); 39 CAL. JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts
§ 381 (Supp. 1987).
Disenchanted by their inability to procure the required insurance
through ordinary means-and their consequent prosecution-the
plaintiffs challenged enforcement of the Act on two theories. First,
asserting that the Act made the right to drive contingent on insur-
ance coverage, the plaintiffs alleged a denial of procedural due pro-
cess, since no mechanism exists to challenge private insurers' rates or
denial of coverage. Second, the plaintiffs asserted that the Legisla-
ture had improperly delegated authority to private insurers by al-
lowing such policy decisions to be made without adequate state
guidance. Curiously, however, no private insurer nor the insurance
commissioner was named as a defendant. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Automo-
bile Insurance § 24 (1980 & Supp. 1987); 8 CAL. JUR. 3D Automobiles
§ 174 (1973 & Supp. 1987).
The court emphasized that resolution of the plaintiffs' request for a
preliminary injunction must be based on two interrelated factors: (1)
the likelihood of the plaintiffs prevailing on the merits at trial; and
(2) the comparative harm to be suffered by the respective parties if
an injunction Were issued. IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, 35 Cal. 3d
63, 69-70, 672 P.2d 121, 125, 196 Cal. Rptr. 715, 719 (1983). The court
determined that the trial court had not erred in finding the balance
of hardships favored the defendants, but it had neglected to consider
the likelihood of the plaintiffs' ultimate success on the merits.
Deeming the Act to have significant social importance, the court-in
an unusual move-opted to resolve the merits rather than remand.
See 6 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies
§§ 248, 283-84 (3d ed. 1985); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions §§ 13-15, 56-57
(1969 & Supp. 1987); 38 CAL. JUR. 3D Injunctions §§ 11-12 (1977 &
Supp. 1987).
In addressing the procedural due process issue, the court dispensed
with the argument that rate-setting and denial of coverage by private
insurers implicates state action. See Shavers v. Kelly, 402 Mich. 554,
267 N.W.2d 72 (1978). The court noted that California has never con-
sidered a private company engaged in a competitive industry to be a
state agent, nor has California considered a company's decisions on
marketing and pricing to equal state action.
In discounting the plaintiffs' challenges, the court determined that
they had no procedural due process right to review or challenge in-
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surers' decisions regarding coverage and rates. Further, the scope of
the state's duty is merely to ensure that the plaintiffs have access to
rates which are neither arbitrary nor capricious. The California Au-
tomobile Assigned Risk Program [hereinafter CAARP] fulfills this
duty through public rate hearings and complaint procedures. See
CAL. INS. CODE §§ 11620-11627 (West 1972 & Supp. 1987); see also 7
AM. JUR. 2DAutomobile Insurance § 21 (1980 & Supp. 1987); 39 CAL.
JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts § 339 (1977 & Supp. 1987).
As to the delegation-of-power issue, the court reaffirmed the long-
standing rule that a statute does not delegate authority to a private
industry unless it specifically empowers that industry to initiate and
enact rules with legal force. See, e.g., Bayside Timber Co. v. Board of
Supervisors, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1, 97 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1971). Thus, stat-
utes which merely permit an insurer to decide to whom to sell, and
at what price, are not unconstitutional.
Finding that the Act comported with procedural due process and
delegation-of-power requirements, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs would not likely prevail on the merits. In affirming denial
of the preliminary injunction, the court emphasized that it would be
an egregious violation of the separation of powers to replace the Leg-
islature's social judgment with its own. See 6 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Provisional Remedies § 282 (3d ed. 1985); 42 AM. JUR.
2DInjunctions § 59 (1969 & Supp. 1987); 38 CAL. JUR. 3DInjunctions
§ 12 (1977 & Supp. 1987).
Limited by the plaintiffs' failure to join the insurance commis-
sioner or private insurers, the court could not adequately delve into
possible rate discrimination practices or improper insurance commis-
sion policies. However, the court appears so uncomfortable with the
magnitude of this social issue that it conveys a readiness to tackle
this issue again, given the appropriate facts . . . and parties. In the
interim, motorists who are uninsurable or are faced with unreasona-
ble rates had best be satisfied with CAARP, or risk losing their
licenses.
BARBARA A. BAYLISS
D. 'Adults Only" residence restrictions in mobilehome
parks under section 798.76 of the Civil Code allow
exclusion of persons under the age of 18: Schmidt v.
Superior Court.
In Schmidt v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 1060, 742 P.2d 209, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 160 (1987), the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of a
statute which permits enforcement of an "adults only" residence re-
quirement within mobilehome parks. In so doing, the court declared
that such statutes do not violate state equal protection principles.
The court also recognized that the legislature intended the statute to
serve as an exception to the Unruh Civil Rights Act [hereinafter Un-
ruh Act]. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-53 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); 12 CAL.
JUR. 3D Civil Rights §§ 3-16 (1974 & Supp. 1987).
The plaintiffs attempted to purchase a mobilehome and to rent
space in a park where the management had established a rule requir-
ing every resident to be twenty-five years of age or older. Since none
of the plaintiffs met this requirement, their rental applications were
rejected. They brought suit, advancing several theories, including vi-
olation of their constitutional rights and violation of the Unruh Act.
The statute challenged, section 798.76 of the Civil Code [hereinaf-
ter section 798.76], directly supports management's right to impose an
adults only limitation on potential renters of spaces within their
parks. CAL. CIv. CODE § 798.76 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); see also 3
B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 421A(7)
(8th ed. Supp. 1984).
After according a literal interpretation to the word "adults," the
court concluded that section 798.76 allows the management of a
mobilehome park to limit residence to those twenty-five years of age
or older, as people within this category certainly fall within the defi-
nition of "adults." The court refused to adopt the plaintiffs' theory
that in light of the Unruh Act, statutory age restrictions are. valid
only if the park is reserved specifically for senior citizens. The court
found, instead, that section 798.76 was intended by the legislature to
be an exception to the Unruh Act.
The plaintiffs also contended that the statutory distinction between
children and adults violated the equal protection clause of the Cali-
fornia constitution. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7(a). Consistent with
previous decisions, the court declined to strictly scrutinize section
798.76, affirming the principle that classifications based on age are
not subject to heightened review. See, e.g., In re Nancy C., 28 Cal.
App. 3d 747, 757, 105 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (1972); Ames v. City of Her-
mosa Beach, 16 Cal. App. 3d 146, 153, 93 Cal. Rptr. 786, 790-91 (1971).
The plaintiffs next contended that the exclusion of children from a
mobilehome park violated their fundamental right to privacy, and
therefore the statute should be strictly scrutinized. The court dis-
agreed, finding that the distinction between adults and others did not
impermissibly impose a direct regulation on family life.
After deciding that section 798.76 did not require strict scrutiny,
the court determined that the section met the appropriate constitu-
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tional standard in that it was rationally related to a legitimate state
goal. The court supplied a number of hypothetical reasons that it
recognized as legitimate, among them: mobilehome spaces are
cramped and poorly suited for family occupancy; as an alternative to
expensive permanent homes, mobilehome parks should not have to
provide the facilities and safeguards that children require.
The court easily disposed of the plaintiffs' two remaining objec-
tions. In the court's view, section 798.76 does not allow mobilehome
park managers to impose restraints on alienation, since the age limi-
tation allowed by the statute relates to the rental agreement for
space within the park, and does not regulate the sale of the
mobilehome itself. Lastly, restrictions imposed by a private owner on
his own property cannot be construed to be an exercise of the state's
zoning power.
This decision may come as a surprise to some, considering the
court's posture with respect to age restrictions imposed by apartment
managers or condominium associations. See Kirsch, Kids Allowed, 3
CAL. LAW., Nov. 1983, at 22-25. It seems clear, however, after exam-
ining the court's speculation as to the legislature's motives in enact-
ing section 798.76, that the court simply does not believe that
mobilehome parks are a practical or vital housing alternative for
families with children or teenagers.
STAFF
III. CRIMINAL LAW
Law enforcement officers have reasonable suspicion to
justify detaining a person to ascertain whether state
truancy laws have been violated when that person is
carrying a book bag on a public street during school
hours and appears to be under eighteen years of age: In
re James D.
In In re James D., 43 Cal. 3d 903, 741 P.2d 161, 239 Cal. Rptr. 663
(1987), the California Supreme Court held that police officers who
detain persons to determine whether they are truant, have reason-
able suspicion to do so if the detention is made during school hours
and the suspect appears to be younger than eighteen years old. The
court asserted that youthful appearance is a valid, objective factor in
establishing reasonable suspicion and that the detainee need not be a
known truant. See generally 20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2491-
2492 (rev. ed. 1985 & Supp. 1987); 56 CAL. JUR. 3D Schools §§ 321-323
(1980 & Supp. 1987).
The case involved a motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained
as the fruit of an illegal detention. The juvenile defendant was
stopped by police officers while carrying a book bag down a public
street at approximately 10:30 a.m. on a school day. Suspecting a tru-
ancy violation, the officers obtained the juvenile's permission to ask
him a few questions, such as his last stopping point and his destina-
tion. The defendant's answers were unsatisfactory and he seemed
"nervous" and "shaky." When he suddenly reached into his pocket,
one of the officers told him to slowly remove his hand. The officer
then frisked the outside of his pocket for weapons; a hard object was
felt and forcibly removed. A hairbrush and an open envelope con-
taining LSD fell to the ground, resulting in the juvenile's arrest for
possession of a controlled substance.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for suppression of
the evidence after concluding that the arresting officers did not have
reasonable suspicion upon which to base their initial detention. The
defendant was, in fact, seventeen years old and a high school gradu-
ate. The suppression was affirmed by the court of appeal, which held
that such detentions are justified only when officers have actual
knowledge of a particular student's truancy.
Referring to relevant portions of the California Education Code,
the supreme court began its analysis by confirming the state's legiti-
mate interest in returning truant students to school. CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 48264 (West 1978). Full time school attendance is mandatory
through age sixteen and is also required until age eighteen unless the
person in question qualifies under one of several exemptions.
The court then considered the circumstances under which a law
enforcement official may stop someone in order to investigate a possi-
ble truancy violation. The court referred to three levels of citizen-
police encounters and the justifications required for each: 1) "consen-
sual encounters"-voluntary questionings unrelated to suspected
crime, which involve no seizure under the fourth amendment nor re-
striction of personal liberty; 2) "detentions"-brief seizures of limited
purpose justified by "reasonable suspicion" that a crime has or is
about to take place and that the person detained is a participant in
that crime (the suspicion is deemed reasonable if there are specific,
articulable facts to support it); and 3) "arrests"-full custodial seizure
with significant restrictions on personal liberty justified only by prob-
able cause that the arrested person was a participant in a crime.
A seizure (i.e., detention or arrest) occurs if "'in view of all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave.'" 43 Cal. 3d at 913, 741
[Vol. 15: 443, 1988] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
P.2d at 165, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (quoting United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). On the other hand, only a consensual
encounter occurs when law enforcement officers approach individu-
als to ask if they would be willing to answer questions in furtherance
of an investigation. However, what might begin as a consensual en-
counter rises to the level of a detention if a reasonable person would
feel constrained to remain with the officer.
Applying this law to the facts at hand, the supreme court was un-
able to ascertain from the record whether the defendant's encounter
with police qualified as detention or merely as a consensual encoun-
ter. The court's analysis differed with that of the lower courts in two
significant respects.
First, the court was unwilling to disregard the state's assertion that
the police-citizen interaction that occurred prior to the arrest was
merely a consensual encounter. The record presented no indication
that either the trial court or the appellate court had seriously consid-
ered this possibility. The trial court was directed to consider this
characterization of the interaction on remand.
Second, the court believed that even if a detention had taken place,
the officers may well have had reasonable suspicion to make the ini-
tial stop and seize the defendant in order to investigate possible tru-
and violations. The court agreed with the defendant's contention
that youthful appearance alone would be insufficient to establish rea-
sonable suspicion, but pointed out that the police did have more in
this case; the officers had also noted that the defendant was carrying
a book bag, thus giving the appearance of a student, and that he was
stopped during school hours. The court determined that the trial
court erred in its belief that the compulsory education laws apply
only to those sixteen years of age and younger; actually the laws gen-
erally apply to those under eighteen.
The court also took issue with the lower court's reasoning that the
police lacked reasonable suspicion because they did not have "actual
notice" that the defendant was truant. The supreme court asserted
in no uncertain terms that actual notice is not required; those articul-
able facts which would create suspicion of truancy in the average rea-
sonable police officer are sufficient. The court, therefore, reversed
the court of appeal's judgment and remanded the case to the trial
court to determine whether the detention, if it was a detention, was
justified.
The court's decision clarifies the criteria for making investigatory
truancy detentions and enhances the police's ability to advance an
important state interest: enforcement of truancy statutes. The
probability that a few persons of youthful appearance may be sub-
jected to momentary detention seems a reasonable price to pay for
the resulting gains.
BRUCE MONROE
iv. DEATH PENALTY LAW
A. Intent to kill is not an element of either the felony-
murder or multiple-murder special circumstance;
however, it is an element of both when the defendant is
an aider and abettor rather than the actual killer.
Bruton-Aranda error (improperly admitted extrajudicial
statements of a nontestifying codefendant which
incriminate the defendant) is harmless if the properly
admitted evidence is overwhelming and the'
incriminating extrajudicial statements are merely
cumulative of other direct evidence: People v. Anderson.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Anderson,1 the California Supreme Court addressed
three issues: 1) whether improperly admitted extrajudicial state-
ments of. a nontestifying codefendant which incriminate the defend-
ant are harmless; 2) whether intent to kill is an element of the
felony-murder special circumstance; and 3) whether intent to kill is
an element of the multiple-murder special circumstance. The court
held that the improperly admitted statements were harmless and
that intent to kill was not an element of either the felony-murder or
the multiple-murder special circumstances.
II. FACTUAL SUMMARY
Defendant James Anderson was sentenced to death under the 1978
death penalty law2 following his conviction of first degree murder,
kidnapping for the purpose of robbery, and robbery of two victims.
The trial court found both the felony-murder 3 and multiple-murder
special circumstance 4 allegations to be true.
The trial court allowed the extrajudicial statements of a nontestify-
1. 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987). Justice Mosk wrote
the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Arguelles, and Eagleson concurred.
Chief Justice Lucas wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justices Broussard and
Kaufman each wrote separate opinions concurring and dissenting in part.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1-190.6 (West Supp. 1988); see also 22 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law §§ 3340-3347 (rev. ed. 1985 & Supp. 1987).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West Supp. 1988).
4. See id. § 190.2(a)(3).
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ing codefendant to be admitted into evidence through the expert tes-
timony concerning the codefendant's diminished capacity. These
statements incriminated both the defendant and the codefendant.
The trial court did not instruct the jury that it must find the de-
fendant acted with intent to kill for the felony-murder and multiple-
murder special circumstance allegations to apply. Additionally, the
prosecutor alleged two multiple-murder special circumstances instead
of one.
During the penalty phase, the court instructed the jurors that the
Governor had the power to modify a sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole to a sentence that would include the pos-
sibility of parole. The death penalty was imposed by the jury.
The case then went before the California Supreme Court on auto-
matic appeal. 5
III. MAJORITY OPINION
A. Guilt Issues
The court found no reversible error with regard to the claims made
by the defendant upon appeal.6 The defendant's major contention
centered around the introduction of certain incriminating, extrajudi-
cial statements of his nontestifying codefendant. Anderson argued
that the introduction of these statements 7 constituted error under
the standards set forth in Bruton v. United States8 and People v.
Aranda9 because it violated his right to confront and cross-examine
the witnesses against him.10
5. See id. § 1239(b).
6. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1118, 742 P.2d at 1311, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 590. The de-
fendant's other contentions concerned: 1) venue; 2) funds for psychiatric and psycho-
logical examinations; 3) jury-selection; 4) "other crimes" evidence; 5) admission of
photographs; and 6) accomplice instructions. The court briefly discussed each and
found all to be without merit. Id. at 1130-38, 742 P.2d at 1319-25, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 599-
604.
7. The statements came into evidence during the cross-examination of the code-
fendant's experts as the bases of their opinions.
8. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
9. 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1965).
10. "Under both the federal and state Constitutions a criminal defendant is guar-
anteed the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him." Anderson,
43 Cal. 3d at 1119, 742 P.2d at 1312, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 591; see also Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 403-05 (1965) (holding the confrontation clause applicable to the states); U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 720-731
(1981 & Supp. 1987). This right is confirmed in section 686 of the Penal Code. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 686(3) (West 1985).
The court readily acknowledged that the introduction of the code-
fendant's extrajudicial statements constituted error under Bruton
and Aranda.11 The Bruton-Aranda rule was designed to bar the ad-
mission of statements which implicate a codefendant and incriminate
a defendant. The court found that the statements were prejudicial
because they constituted the type of "'evidence against a defendant
... which [jurors] cannot put out of their minds.' "12, Further, the co-
defendant's conflicting, exculpatory testimony made the statements
highly unreliable.13
The court then considered whether this type of error was revers-
ible. After examining several cases which had considered the revers-
ibility of Bruton-Aranda error,14 the court concluded that two
elements are necessary for the error to be considered harmless: "(1)
the properly admitted evidence [must be] overwhelming; and (2) the
evidence provided by the incriminating extrajudicial statement [must
be] cumulative of other direct evidence .. ."15 Both elements were
unquestionably present in this case and so the error was deemed
harmless.16
11. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1122, 742 P.2d at 1314, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 593; see B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trial §§ 293A-293G (Supp. I 1985).
12. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1122, 742 P.2d at 1314, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 593 (citing
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129) (citation omitted); see Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d at 528-30, 407 P.2d at
271-72, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60.
13. See Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (1986); Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136.
14. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973) (error held harmless where
the improper evidence was cumulative of an overwhelming amount of uncontroverted
evidence); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1972) (error held harmless in light
of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, including the defendant's own confession); Har-
rington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969) (no reversible error found where the
testimony of codefendant, which was to the effect that the defendant was at the crime
scene, was duplicative of defendant's own admission); People v. Leach, 15 Cal. 3d 419,
445-46, 541 P.2d 296, 314, 124 Cal. Rptr. 752, 770 (1975) (defendant was not prejudiced
by hearsay declarations of coconspirator because the statements were cumulative and
the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming); People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694,
721, 464 P.2d 64, 81, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 625 (1970) (error found to be harmless where the
codefendant's statement was ambiguous and insubstantial); In re Whitehorn, 1 Cal. 3d
504, 512-17, 462 P.2d 361, 366-69, 82 Cal. Rptr. 609, 614-17 (1969) (error held harmless
where the codefendant's statements were cumulative of defendant's own extrajudicial
statements); In re Lara, 1 Cal. 3d 486, 488-90, 462 P.2d 380, 382, 82 Cal. Rptr. 628, 630
(1969) (no reversible error found in the admission of the codefendant's statement, as
the defendant confessed to the police); In re Hill, 71 Cal. 2d 997, 1013-14, 458 P.2d 449,
457-59, 80 Cal. Rptr. 537, 545-47 (1969) (no reversible error resulted from the admission
of the codefendant's statement where evidence of the defendant's guilt was over-
whelming); In re Sears, 71 Cal. 2d 379, 387-88, 455 P.2d 116, 120-22, 78 Cal. Rptr. 180,
183-86 (1969) (error held reversible in that the record did not establish beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the codefendant's statements did not contribute to the verdict);
People v. Flores, 68 Cal. 2d 563, 567-68, 440 P.2d 233, 235-36, 68 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163-64
(1968) (error held harmless because the implicating nature of the codefendant's state-
ment was tenuous).
15. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1129, 742 P.2d at 1319, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 598.
16. Id.
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B. Special-Circumstance Issues
The defendant alleged that the trial court failed to instruct the ju-
rors that intent to kill was a potential element of the felony-murder
special circumstance as required by Carlos v. Superior Court.17 The
court decided that part of the rationale of Carlos, the Enmund inter-
pretation,'8 was improper. Enmund has been interpreted to put into
issue under the eighth amendment, "'whether the death penalty can
be imposed on anyone who did not intend or contemplate a killing,
even the actual killer.' "19 The court reasoned that its understanding
of Enmund, at the time it decided Carlos, was in accord with case
law20 and the commentaries.21 The court explained that recent
United States Supreme Court cases indicated that Enmund has been
interpreted too broadly.22 In Cabana v. Bullock,23 the Supreme
Court held that the eighth amendment did not require intent to kill
in order to sentence a defendant to death.24 In Tison v. Arizona,25
the Supreme Court held that the California Supreme Court had
based its Carlos decision on certain federal constitutional limitations
that it had perceived from Enmund.26 Therefore, the California
Supreme Court found, by implication, that the United States
Supreme Court disagreed with its interpretation of Enmund.27
A reexamination of Carlos was then undertaken by the court.
Starting with the statutory provisions, the court noted that section
190.2(a)(17) of the Penal Code, by itself, cannot be read to require a
finding of intent to kill.28 This conclusion was bolstered by three
facts: 1) the language of the provision does not require an intent to
17. 35 Cal. 3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1983).
18. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
19. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1139, 742 P.2d at 1326, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 605 (quoting
Carlos, 35 Cal. 3d at 150, 672 P.2d at 875, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 92) (emphasis in original).
20. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 628 (1978).
21. See, e.g., Hubbard, Burry & Widener, A "Meaningful" Basis for the Death Pen-
alty: The Practice, Constitutionality, and Justice of Capital Punishment in South Car-
olina, 34 S.C.L. REV. 391, 513-14 (1982); Roth & Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A
Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 484 (1985).
22. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1140, 742 P.2d at 1326, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
23. 474 U.S. 376 (1986).
24. Id. at 390-91.
25. 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987).
26. Id. at 1686 n.8.
27. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1141, 742 P.2d at 1327, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
28. Id. Section 190.2(a)(17) of the California Penal Code provides:
(a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree
shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole in any case in which one or more of the following special
kill; 2) ten of the eighteen remaining special circumstances require
an intentional killing; and 3) the 1978 death penalty law repealed the
1977 law which had specifically required intentional killing before
the jury could find a felony-murder special circumstance. 29
Section 190.2(b) of the Penal Code 30 did not change the court's con-
clusion. The court held that section 190.2(b) added an exception to
the general rule which requires intent to kill.31 Thus, section
190.2(a) delineates the special circumstances applicable to all first de-
gree murderers, and mandates that the intent to kill requirement is
only included selectively in the special circumstances. 32 Section
190.2(a)(17) is merely definitional and does not require intent to
kill.33 Finally, the court found that section 190.2(b) established a spe-
cific rule applicable to a limited class of first degree murderers. In
order to prove the special circumstance, an aider and abettor must be
shown to have committed the crime with intent to kill, unless he has
a prior murder conviction.34
The court held that section 190.2(b) applies exclusively to an aider
circumstances has been charged and specially found under Section 190.4, to be
true: ...
(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in or
was an accomplice in the commission of, attempted commission of, or the im-
mediate flight after committing or attempting to commit the following felo-
nies:
(i) Robbery in violation of Section 211.
(ii) Kidnapping in violation of Sections 207 and 209.
(iii) Rape in violation of Section 261.
(iv) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.
(v) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon person of a child
under the age of 14 in violation of Section 288.
(vi) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.
(vii) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460.
(viii) Arson in violation of Section 447.
(ix) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17) (West Supp. 1988).
29. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1141-42, 742 P.2d at 1327, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 606-07; see
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West Supp. 1988).
30. Section 190.2(b) of the California Penal Code provides:
(b) Every person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of inten-
tionally aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, soliciting, request-
ing, or assisting any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree
shall suffer death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole, in any case in which one or more of the special circum-
stances enumerated in paragraphs (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9), (10), (11),
(12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), or (19) of subdivision (a) of this section has
been charged and specially found under Section 190.4 to be true.
The penalty shall be determined as provided in Sections 190.1, 190.2, 190.3,
190.4, and 190.5.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(b) (West Supp. 1988).
31. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1142, 742 P.2d at 1327, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
32. Id. at 1142, 742 P.2d at 1328, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 607; see CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a) (West Supp. 1987).
33. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1142, 742 P.2d at 1328, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
34. Id. at 1142, 742 P.2d at 1328, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
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and abettor because the language used "generally and traditionally"
illustrated the conduct of an aider and abettor. 35 Further, if section
190.2(b) was interpreted to include both the actual killer and his
aider and abettor, the statute would have retroactively inserted an in-
tent-to-kill element into each special circumstance.36
The court concluded that its decision in Carlos was erroneous be-
cause it was based on the understanding that section 190.2(a)(17) of
the Penal Code was ambiguous. 37 The two bases for the conclusion
of ambiguity, however, were no longer viable.38 First, the insertion
of an intent-to-kill requirement would not produce "anomalous re-
sults," nor would it be "difficult to defend."39 Anomalous results
were a product of the legislature's selective inclusion of certain felo-
nies, rather than others, within section 189 of the Penal Code.40 The
legislature's decision was not difficult to defend when the court rea-
soned that the legislators may have believed the felonies not included
in section 189 were less serious.
Further, anomalous results could still flow from reading an intent-
to-kill requirement into section 190.2(a)(17). 41 The lack of an intent-
to-kill requirement in section 190.2(a)(17) would not render the
meaning of section 190.2(b) ambiguous. Section 190.2(a)(17) pertains
to the culpability of the defendant and his aider and abettor. It
makes both of them felony murderers. Section 190.2(b) provides that
the felony-murder aider and abettor may be sentenced to death only
if intent to kill is proven.
35. Id.
36. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1987).
37. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1143, 742 P.2d at 1329, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Section 189 of the California Penal Code provides:
All murder which is perpetrated by means of a destructive device or explo-
sive, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or ar-
mor, poison, lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration of, or at-
tempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act pun-
ishable under Section 288, is murder of the first degree; and all other kinds of
murders are of the second degree.
As used in this section, "destructive device" shall mean any destructive de-
vice as defined in Section 12301, and "explosive" shall mean any explosive as
defined in Section 12000 of the Health and Safety Code.
To prove the killing was "deliberate and premeditated," it shall not be nec-
essary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the
gravity of his or her act.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West Supp. 1988).
41. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1144, 742 P.2d at 1329, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
The court went on to explain that the Carlos decision would be er-
roneous even if section 190.2(a)(17) were ambiguous. 42 Rules of stat-
utory construction provide that a criminal defendant is entitled to
the benefit of realistic doubts;43 the court found that no realistic
doubt existed as to the meaning of section 190.2(a)(17). 44
Further, assuming two realistic interpretations of section
190.2(a)(17), the present interpretation did not raise "grave and
doubtful constitutional questions."45 First, under federal law, Bul-
lock and Tison had swept away the concerns supposedly raised by En-
mund.46 Second, neither the eighth amendment nor the equal
protection clause would render this reading of section 190.2(a)(17)
" 'a statutory classification which impose[s] a minimum penalty of
death or imprisonment without parole upon persons who did not in-
tend to kill, while permitting some deliberate killers to escape with a
sentence of life with possibility of parole....' "47 In Furman v. Geor-
gia,48 Justice White stated that by allowing the felony murderer, but
not the simple murderer, to be eligible for the death penalty, a death
penalty law provides a basis for distinguishing cases where death is
sentenced from cases in which it is not.49 It is generally accepted
that such a classification is not violative of the equal protection
clause.5 0
Accordingly, the court overruled Carlos and held that the trial
court had not erred by omitting instructions on intent.51 The evi-
dence presented at trial showed either that the defendant was guilty
of murder or was not involved at all.
The defendant also alleged that the court failed to give the instruc-
tion required by People v. Turner,52 that the multiple-murder special
circumstances contained an intent to kill requirement. The court ap-
42. Id. at 1145, 742 P.2d at 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
43. Id.; see United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948) (one ambiguous word
will not be interpreted to contradict the whole content of the remaining language); see
also United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 552 (1938) (a penal statute need not be
strained, distorted, or given the narrowest possible meaning); People v. Hallner, 43
Cal. 2d 715, 721, 277 P.2d 393, 397 (1954) (common sense and evident statutory purpose
should not be overriden).
44. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1146, 742 P.2d at 1330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
45. Id. at 1146, 742 P.2d at 1330-31, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
46. Id. at 1146, 742 P.2d at 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 610. See supra notes 22-28 and
accompanying text.
47. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1146-47, 742 P.2d at 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (citing
Carlos, 35 Cal. 3d at 148, 672 P.2d at 873, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 91).
48. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
49. Id. at 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring); accord Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420, 427 (1980) (plurality opinion).
50. Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1104 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 910
(1983).
51. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1147, 742 P.2d at 1331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 611.
52. 37 Cal. 3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984).
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plied its analysis of the felony-murder special circumstance to this
contention 53 and held that the wording of sections 190.2(a)(3)54 and
190.2(b)55 of the Penal Code implies that intent to kill is not an ele-
ment of the offense unless the defendant was an aider and abettor.5 6
Also, the 1977 death penalty law contained an express intent-to-kill
requirement in its multiple-murder special circumstance.5 7 Conspic-
uously, the multiple-murder special circumstance under the present
law does not contain such a requirement.58 This comparison com-
pelled the court to conclude that intent to kill was not required for
the actual killer, only for the aider and abettor.59 The court then
overruled Turner and held that the trial court had not erred in fail-
ing to give an intent instruction because evidence was not presented
showing that the defendant was an aider and abettor.6O
Additionally, the court noted that only a single multiple-murder
special circumstance exists regardless of the number of murder
charges. 61 Thus, it was error for the prosecution to allege two multi-
ple-murder special circumstances. 62 One had to be vacated.
C Penalty Phase Issue
The defendant made only one contention with regard to the pen-
alty phase of his trial. He argued that under People v. Ramos,63 the
trial court committed reversible error when it gave an instruction re-
garding the governor's power to modify a sentence of imprisonment
without possibility of parole to a sentence which includes the possi-
53. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1149, 742 P.2d at 1332, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
54. Section 190.2(a)(3) provides:
(a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree
shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the
possibility of parole in any case in which one or more of the following special
circumstances has been charged and specially found under Section 190.4, to be
true: . . .
(3) The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one
offense of murder in the first or second degree.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(3) (West Supp. 1988).
55. See supra note 30.
56. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1149, 742 P.2d at 1132-33, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
57. Id. at 1149, 742 P.2d at 1133, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
58. See supra note 30.
59. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1149, 742 P.2d at 1133, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
60. Id. at 1149-50, 742 P.2d at 1133, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
61. Id. at 1150, 742 P.2d at 1133, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
62. Id. at 1150, 742 P.2d at 1133, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13.
63. 37 Cal. 3d 136, 689 P.2d 430, 207 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984).
bility of parole.64 The court held this to be reversible error because
the instruction "necessarily subject[ed] the defendant to prejudice."65
The judgment of death was therefore reversed.
IV. CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Chief Justice Lucas
Chief Justice Lucas wrote a short concurring opinion to express his
reservations regarding the majority's finding of Bruton-Aranda
error.
66
B. Justice Broussard
Justice Broussard wrote a lengthy concurring and dissenting opin-
ion in which he strongly disagreed with the majority's decision to
overrule Carlos and Turner.67 He expressed concern that under the
majority's interpretation, a defendant could now be sentenced to
death for an accidental or negligent murder.68
Justice Broussard's opinion centered on the importance of follow-
ing precedent 69 and the improper statutory interpretation by the ma-
jority. 70 He noted that the majority quoted "insignificant dictum
from Cabana v. Bullock and a mistaken footnote in Tison v. Ari-
zona."71 Further, Justice Broussard noted that Carlos was not de-
cided out of fear that Enmund might make the 1978 death penalty
law invalid.72
The Justice then briefly concluded by stating his agreement with
the majority's conclusion regarding the trial court's instruction on
the governor's commutation power.73
C. Justice Kaufman
Justice Kaufman wrote a brief concurring and dissenting opinion
in which he generally concurred with the majority, but dissented
64. See 2 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Punishment for Crime §§ 1103-1111 (2d
ed. 1963 & Supp. II 1985).
65. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1151, 742 P.2d at 1133-34, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 613; see Peo-
ple v. Montiel, 39 Cal. 3d 910, 928, 705 P.2d 1248, 1258, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 572, 582-83
(1985). See generally Ramos, 37 Cal. 3d at 153-59, 689 P.2d at 440-44, 207 Cal. Rptr. at
810-14.
66. Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1151, 742 P.2d at 1334, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 613 (Lucas,
C.J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1151-52, 742 P.2d at 1334, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14 (Broussard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting.)
68. Id. at 1152, 742 P.2d at 1334, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
69. Id. at 1153, 1164-66, 742 P.2d at 1335, 1343-44, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15, 623-24.
70. Id. at 1156-62, 742 P.2d at 1338-41, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 617-21.
71. Id. at 1155, 742 P.2d at 1336, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
72. Id. at 1155, 742 P.2d at 1337, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
73. Id. at 1166-67, 742 P.2d at 1345, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
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from their conclusion that Bruton-Aranda error had occurred.74
V. CONCLUSION
The court's holding represents a radical departure from the "estab-
lished norms" of criminal law. The death penalty has traditionally
been viewed as a harsh form of punishment, to be used with extreme
caution. This decision will undoubtedly lead to anguish, protest, and
many executions.
However, while the court's decision appears to be unusually harsh,
the majority cannot be faulted for their well-reasoned interpretation
of section 190.2 of the Penal Code. This is not to say that it is accept-
able to execute someone for an unintentional killing. Rather, the
problem, if there is one, lies with the legislature. It is possible that
the only solution to be found is a challenge to the constitutionality of
the law. The United States Supreme Court can then determine the
morality of taking one human life for the accidental or negligent kill-
ing of another.
One very real and imminent problem with this decision is its appli-
cation. Questions have already arisen as to its applicability to cases in
which the murder was committed before Carlos, and to those cases in
which the murder was committed before Anderson, but after Carlos.
STAFF
B. The claim-of-right defense is not available where the
underlying transaction is illegal; evidence of prior
violent conduct is admissible notwithstanding
conviction. The jury has ultimate discretion to
impose the death penalty after weighing the
aggravating and mitigating factors: People v. Gates.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Gates,1 the court upheld the imposition of the death
penalty following a finding of first degree murder during the com-
mission of a robbery.2 The court rejected the defendant's numerous
74. Id. at 1167, 742 P.2d at 1345, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
1. 43 Cal. 3d 1168, 743 P.2d 301, 240 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1987). Justice Panelli wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arguelles, Eagleson,
and Kaufman concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurring and dissenting
opinion, in which Justice Broussard concurred.
2. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 11; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190, 190.1, 1239 (West Supp.
1987).
assertions that the trial court erred and concluded that any resultant:
error was merely harmless.
As to the guilt phase, the court stated that a claim-of-right defense
may not be asserted when it is based upon an illegal transaction.
Further, even if a defendant waives his right to a speedy trial, his un-
related prosecution elsewhere in the state constitutes good cause for
any delay to which he has not consented. Additionally, no instruc-
tion on intent to kill is required in felony-murder cases where the de-
fendant is the actual killer rather than an accomplice.
In the penalty phase, the court followed the traditional view that a
single jury should decide both phases of the trial, absent a showing of
prejudice. The court reiterated that the jury is the ultimate decision-
maker as to imposition of the death penalty, after weighing the ag-
gravating and mitigating factors.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The defendant was convicted of first degree murder with a finding
of special circumstances, assault with a deadly weapon, robbery, and
related violations of the California Penal Code. The defendant, a
member of a forgery ring which included his two victims, was at-
tempting to obtain his share of the forgery proceeds, at the time of
the incident.
Following his arrest in December of 1979, the defendant gave a
general waiver of his right to a speedy trial, due in part to unrelated
murder charges pending elsewhere in the state. The case eventually
came to trial in 1981.
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A. The Guilt Phase
The defense asserted seven areas of error in the guilt phase of the
proceedings: 1) denial Of an instruction on a claim-of-right defense; 2)
admission of a taped statement by the surviving victim; 3) improper
rebuttal testimony; 4) prosecutorial misconduct; 5) multiple use of
the same robbery; 6) denial of a speedy trial; and 7) improper instruc-
tions regarding the special circumstances. The court found no merit
in the alleged errors, and concluded that the defendant had received
a fair trial.
1. The claim-of-right defense
The court noted that a claim-of-right defense arises where a de-
fendant believes, even mistakenly, that he has a right or claim to the
property sought. This belief negates felonious intent, and precludes a
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finding of robbery. 3 The court indicated, however, that such a right
does not arise from an illegal transaction, such as the defendant's
participation in a forgery ring.4
2. Admission of the taped statement
The court indicated that it was barred from considering the admis-
sibility of a taped statement due to the defendant's failure to object at
trial.5 The court further determined that the record did not support
the contention that this failure to object was the result of ineffective
counsel. The court stated that such an allegation must be supported
by a showing that: 1) counsel failed to act in the manner expected of
a reasonably competent attorney; and 2) a more favorable determina-
tion for the appellant would reasonably have resulted absent coun-
sel's error.6 The court concluded that counsel may have had strategic
reasons justifying his actions and that a more favorable verdict would
not have been rendered if the jury had not listened to the tape.7
3. The rebuttal testimony
The court stated that proper rebuttal evidence is restricted to that
necessitated by the defense case, in order to prevent unfair surprise
and undue magnification of certain evidence.8 The court accepted the
prosecution's explanation for not including the rebuttal witness in its
case-in-chief, 9 and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in
allowing the testimony.
4. Prosecutorial misconduct
In considering the defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct,
the court made two observations. First, a defendant "'can be cross-
3. See People v. Butler, 65 Cal. 2d 569, 573, 421 P.2d 703, 705, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511, 514
(1967).
4. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1182, 743 P.2d at 310, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
5. Id. at 1183, 743 P.2d at 310, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
6. Id. at 1183, 743 P.2d at 311, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 676; see also People v. Fosselman,
33 Cal. 3d 572, 584, 659 P.2d 1144, 1151, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 862 (1983). See generally
Comment, A Coherent Approach to the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 1516 (1983).
7. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1183, 743 P.2d at 311, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
8. Id. at 1184, 743 P.2d at 311, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 676; see also People v. Carter, 48
Cal. 2d 737, 753-54, 312 P.2d 665, 674-75 (1957); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093(c) (West Supp.
1987).
9. Prior to presentation of the defendant's case, the prosecution was unaware of
the forgery ring and assumed the shooting was drug-related. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1184,
743 P.2d at 311, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
examined with respect to facts or denials which are necessarily im-
plied from the testimony in chief. . . .'"1o Second, although a prose-
cutor has wide latitude in expressing his views of the evidence and
the conclusions to be drawn therefrom, he may not express his per-
sonal belief as to a witness' reliability." In applying these concepts,
the court found that the prosecutor did not overstep his bounds. 12
5. Multiple use of the robbery
The court summarily dismissed the defendant's allegation of
double jeopardy.13 In so doing, the court relied on its recent decision
rejecting the argument that double jeopardy or multiple punishment
arises from the use of the same felony for first degree murder and
felony murder special circumstances. 14
6. Denial of speedy trial
The court found that the defendant's claim of a violation of his
right to a speedy trial was supplanted by a general time waiver.15
Further, since the defendant was also being prosecuted for another
crime elsewhere in the state, good cause existed for any delays to
which the defendant had not consented.16
7. Improper instructions on special circumstances
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the trial court should
have instructed the jury that it could not convict for the special cir-
cumstance of robbery-murder unless it found the requisite intent.
The court stated that such an instruction is appropriate only when
the evidence indicates the defendant was an accomplice, rather than
the actual killer.17
10. Id. at 1185, 743 P.2d at 312, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (quoting People v. Teschara,
141 Cal. 633, 638, 75 P. 338, 340 (1904)).
11. Id. at 1188, 743 P.2d at 314, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 679; see People v. Perez, 58 Cal. 2d
229, 245, 373 P.2d 617, 626, 23 Cal. Rptr. 569, 578 (1962).
12. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1188, 743 P.2d at 314, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See generally Note, The Death Penalty and Fed-
eralism: Eighth Amendment Constraints on Allocation of State Decisionmaking
Power, 35 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1983).
14. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1189-90, 743 P.2d at 315, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (citing People
v. Balderas, 41 Cal. 3d 144, 200-01, 711 P.2d 480, 512-13, 222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 216 (1985)).
15. Id. at 1190, 743 P.2d at 315, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 680; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 859(b)
(West 1985); see also B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trials §§ 299-308,
316-317 (1963 & Supp. 1985); Misner, The 1979 Amendments to the Speedy Trial Act:
Death of the Planning Process, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 635 (1981); 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal
Law §§ 652-665, 849-861, 864-867 (1981 & Supp. 1987); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 28 (1974
& Supp. 1987); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law §§ 2898-2913 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
16. See Crockett v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 433, 441 n.10, 535 P.2d 321, 327 n.10,
121 Cal. Rptr. 457, 463 n.10 (1975).
17. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1193, 743 P.2d at 317, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (citing People v.
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B. The Penalty Phase
The defendant's objections to the penalty phase proceedings were
founded upon five issues: 1) denial of a motion to re-voir dire the
jury; 2) instructions and comments on the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances; 3) the admission of evidence of other crimes; 4)
prosecutorial misconduct; and 5) ineffectiveness of counsel.
1. Denial of motion to re-voir dire the jury
The court noted the long-standing legislative preference that a sin-
gle jury determine both guilt and penalty.lS The defendant con-
tended that the jury should be dismissed, or at least re-questioned,
based upon general allegations of prejudicial publicity regarding
crimes and criticism of the judicial system. The court dismissed these
allegations as "entirely speculative." 19
2. Instructions and comments on the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances
The court rejected the defendant's assertions that the trial court
misled the jury as to their responsibility to consider mitigating evi-
dence.20 Commenting that "[j]urors are not without common sense,"
the court indicated that an instruction to "consider all of the evi-
dence" was sufficient. 21 Similarly, the trial court's comments on the
aggravating factors were not deemed improper.22 A trial court may
fairly comment on the evidence, provided it does not invade the prov-
ince of the jury.23
The court also noted its decision in People v. Brown,24 that a juror
is not required to vote for the death penalty upon completion of the
weighing process unless he determines that death is appropriate
under all the circumstances. Here, the court found that the trial
Anderson, 43 Cal. 3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987)); see CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 190.2, 190.4 (West Supp. 1987).
18. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1199, 743 P.2d at 321, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 686; see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.4(c) (West Supp. 1987).
19. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1199, 743 P.2d at 321, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 686.
20. Id. at 1200, 743 P.2d at 321, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 686; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West Supp. 1987).
21. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1200, 743 P.2d at 322, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
22. Id. at 1208, 743 P.2d 326, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92.
23. Id. at 1207, 743 P.2d at 326, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 691; see People v. Cook, 33 Cal. 3d
400, 407, 658 P.2d 86, 90, 189 Cal. Rptr. 159, 163 (1983); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
24. 40 Cal. 3d 412, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985), rev'd on other grounds
sub noma., California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987).
court's comments "as a whole" adequately conveyed to the jury this
notion of ultimate discretion.2s
Further, the trial court has no duty to act sua sponte at the penalty
phase to issue a cautionary instruction regarding the defendant's fail-
ure to testify during the penalty phase. 26 The court indicated that
such an instruction here would only be confusing since the defendant
testified during the guilt phase.
3. Evidence of other crimes
The court upheld the introduction of evidence regarding the de-
fendant's prior criminal acts.27 The court emphasized that the signif-
icance of the evidence lies in the defendant's conduct, not in the fact
of a conviction.28 Where evidence involves "violent conduct," it is
still admissible notwithstanding a conviction.29
4. Prosecutorial misconduct
The court found that the prosecutor did not improperly cross-ex-
amine the defendant's psychologist on the issue of the defendant's
propensity for future violence in prison, indicating this issue was ini-
tially raised on direct.30 The court also determined that although the
prosecutor may have drawn an improper inference as to the type of
bullet used by the defendant in a prior shooting, the error was
harmless.31
5. Ineffectiveness of counsel
Finally, the court disagreed that defense counsel was ineffective by
failing to cross-examine any of the prosecution's witnesses regarding
the defendant's prior crimes. The court recognized that cross-exami-
nation of these witnesses may have placed even greater emphasis on
the evidence. 32
25. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1208, 743 P.2d at 326, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92.
26. Id. at 1208, 743 P.2d at 327, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 692. See generally 75 AM. JUR. 2D
Trials §§ 656-685 (1974 & Supp. 1987); 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trials §§ 1045-1046 (1975 & Supp.
1987); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law §§ 3049-3053, 3067-3096 (1985 & Supp.
1987).
27. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1203, 743 P.2d at 323, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89; see CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1987).
28. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1203, 743 P.2d at 323, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 688-89; see CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1987).
29. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1203, 743 P.2d at 323, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 689; see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190.3(b) (West Supp. 1987).
30. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1211, 743 P.2d at 328-29, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
31. Id. at 1212, 743 P.2d at 329, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 694. See generally B. WITKIN, CAL-
IFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trials § 441 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trials§§ 106, 109 (1974 & Supp. 1987); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D (REV.) Criminal Law §§ 2944-2969
(1985 & Supp. 1987).
32. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1213, 743 P.2d at 330, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 695. See generally
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IV. JUSTICE MOSK'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
Although concurring in the judgment of guilt and finding of special
circumstances, Justice Mosk considered the instructional errors dur-
ing the penalty phase so confusing as to warrant a new penalty phase
trial.33 Specifically, Justice Mosk found two areas where the instruc-
tions were deficient.
First, as to the weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors,
the trial court's instructions implied that the weighing process itself
determined the penalty.34 Justice Mosk noted, however, that the
jury has the ultimate choice as to the imposition of the penalty, re-
gardless of the weighing process.35
Second, although reiterating the aggravating factors, the trial court
neglected to describe any of the mitigating evidence. Justice Mosk
considered this purposeful exclusion clearly prejudicial in light of re-
cent Supreme Court rulings.36
V. CONCLUSION
Although the court breaks no new ground in Gates, it acknowl-
edges the broad latitude of the court and counsel to comment on the
evidence presented. Only a thin line separates zealous advocacy from
impermissible overreaching. The court implies that as long as the
overreaching is harmless, it is acceptable. Yet, the court neglects to
consider the cumulative effect of such comments over the entire
course of a trial.
. -Further, Gates raises the question of the validity of the weighing
process during the penalty phase. The process, inherently, is not
mechanical. Thus, its inevitably subjective analysis can easily be
manipulated by jurors to support a pre-determined penalty. If the
jury can ultimately impose any penalty it deems appropriate, the su-
perficial weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors serves no le-
gitimate purpose.
BARBARA A. BAYLISS
Comment, supra note 6; 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 748-753, 984-985 (1981 &
Supp. 1987).
33. Gates, 43 Cal. 3d at 1214, 743 P.2d at 331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 696 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
34. Id. at 1215, 743 P.2d at 331, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
35. Id..
36. Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978)).
V. PENSION LAW
When an employer has knowledge of an employee's
incapacity, minor deficiencies in the employee's
application for disability retirement do not defeat the
employee's due process right to a hearing by the
retirement board to resolve factual questions related to
his eligibility: Thompson v. City of San Diego.
In Thompson v. City of San Diego, 43 Cal. 3d 1033, 741 P.2d 613, 239
Cal. Rptr. 805 (1987), the California Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee's due process rights were violated when the retirement board
refused to grant him a hearing to determine whether his incapacitat-
ing injury occurred before he was eligible for retirement benefits.
Although interpretation of the applicable city ordinance was an issue
in the case, the court declined to decide which party's interpretation
was correct. Instead, the court ordered the lower courts to issue a
writ of mandate to force the retirement board to hold a hearing on
the matter. See generally 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW, Agency and Employment § 212 (8th ed. 1973); 60 AM. JUR. 2D
Pensions and Retirement Funds §§ 68-72 (1972 & Supp. 1987); 49 CAL.
JUR. 3D Pensions and Retirement Systems §§ 34-36 (1979 & Supp.
1987).
The plaintiff was a police officer recruit who had begun training at
the defendant City's police academy. Two weeks after he started
work he injured his knees on a bench during a running exercise at
the academy. While undergoing treatment for his knees, including
surgery on his left knee, the plaintiff temporarily assumed desk du-
ties. Several months later he underwent a medical examination at
the department's request to evaluate whether he was able to return
to active training. The examining physician's conclusion that the
plaintiff could resume training conflicted with the opinion of an or-
thopedist who had been treating the plaintiff's knee problems.
Knowing of the disagreement in medical opinions, the police depart-
ment insisted that the plaintiff return to training and warned him
that if he did not, he would be subject to immediate termination.
A combination of the orthopedist's discouraging prognosis concern-
ing his knee condition and the plaintiff's fear that premature re-
sumption of training could exacerbate his disability produced severe
depression in the plaintiff, whose life's ambition was to become a po-
lice officer. He attempted suicide the day before he was scheduled to
return to training at the academy. Although the attempt was not
successful, the plaintiff was emotionally and psychologically unable
to return to work in any capacity.
City employees serving as peace officers were not eligible to join
the retirement program until six months after beginning employ-
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ment. The suicide attempt had occurred approximately ten months
after initial employment, and the plaintiff later applied for disability
retirement, listing the nature of his incapacity as "injury to both
knees and anxiety ... resulting in need for orthopedic and psychiat-
ric care." Thompson, 43 Cal. 3d at 1037, 741 P.2d at 615, 239 Cal. Rptr.
at 807. The retirement board rejected the plaintiff's application with-
out a hearing because his application indicated that his initial injury
(the knee injury) took place before he was a member of the retire-
ment system and thus he was ineligible for disability retirement.
Section 24.0501 of the San Diego Municipal Code provided that
members of the City's retirement system who suffered permanent in-
capacity resulting from an injury or disease caused by or during the
course of employment were to receive a retirement allowance, re-
gardless of age or amount of service. Section 24.0501 further pro-
vided that members permanently incapacitated due to any other
reason were to be given a retirement allowance but only after ten
years of service. The plaintiff maintained that regardless of the date
of his initial injury, his permanent incapacitation was psychological
in nature and did not occur until after he was a member of the retire-
ment system. Therefore, he claimed, his due process rights entitled
him to a hearing to determine the date upon which he became dis-
abled. The City countered by arguing that because the plaintiff's ap-
plication did not identify his psychological injury as a separate
disability, the City was not required to recognize it as such and grant
him a hearing.
The plaintiff also contended that the City had been put on notice of
his psychological problems immediately after his suicide attempt and
had been kept fully informed of the plaintiff's physical and psycho-
logical conditions. In fact, the City had a specialist review his psychi-
atric records.
Recognizing the differences in the plaintiff's and defendant's inter-
pretations of the applicable City ordinance regarding significance of
the initial injury, the question of which interpretation was correct
was not reached. The court's unanimous opinion instead reflected
the view that even under the City's interpretation, the City had suffi-
cient knowledge of the separate psychological basis for the plaintiff's
claim that the fiduciary relationship between retirement board and
employee required the board to resolve any uncertainties in his appli-
cation by consulting the plaintiff. The court then ordered lower
courts to issue the writ of mandate sought by the plaintiff compelling
the retirement board to grant him a hearing.
Thompson stands for the proposition that an employer may not
hide behind a cloak of constructive ignorance in denying an em-
ployee's right to an important hearing when it has actual knowledge
of its employee's condition. Employers must make use of all of their
knowledge and retirement boards must inquire to clarify factual
ambiguities.
BRUCE MONROE
vi. REMEDIAL LAW
A. Sliding scale recovery agreements are subject to the good
faith requirements of section 877 of the Civil Procedure
Code and entitle non-settling tortfeasors to an offset
based on the Tech-Bilt reasonable value approach: Abbott
Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court,' the court answered the un-
resolved question from its 1985 decision in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Wood-
ward-Clyde & Associates2 : whether a sliding scale recovery
agreement 3 [hereinafter SSA] constitutes a good faith settlement
under section 877 of the Civil Procedure Code (section 877),4 or
whether such an agreement is inherently invalid. The court held
that an SSA is valid if its assessed value falls within the "ballpark,"
as defined in Tech-Bilt.5 Absent evidence of collusive conduct be-
tween the plaintiff and the settling defendant, the SSA would then
fulfill the good faith requirement of section 877. The court indicated
1. 43 Cal. 3d 858, 741 P.2d 124, 239 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1987). Justice Panelli wrote the
majority opinion with Justices Lucas, Arguelles, Eagleson, and Kaufman concurring.
Justice Broussard concurred in a separate opinion. Justice Mosk dissented.
2. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
3. Sliding scale recovery agreements [hereinafter SSA's] are commonly known as
"Mary Carter Agreements," based on the case of Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202
So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967), overruled in Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 388 (Fla.
1973). A typical SSA provides that the plaintiff will not receive less than a guaranteed
amount. The guarantor agrees to pay the difference should the plaintiff's recovery
from the remaining defendants be less. Similarly, the guarantor is absolved of all fi-
nancial responsibility should the plaintiff recover more than the guaranteed amount.
See generally 5 N. LEVY, M. GOLDEN, L. SACKS, & J. CHAPIN, CALIFORNIA TORTS
§ 73.08(2) (1987) [hereinafter 5 N. LEVY]; 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,'
Torts § 42A (8th ed. Supp. 1984); Comment, California Code of Civil Procedure Sec-
tions 877, 877.5 and 877.6: The Settlement Game in the Ballpark that Tech-Bilt, 13 PEP-
PERDINE L. REV. 823, 841-46 (1986).
4. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
5. The "reasonable value approach" requires that the settlement amount be "in
the ballpark" of what the settling tortfeasor would expect to pay if found liable at
trial. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264; see Comment,
California's Sliding Scale Settlement Agreements-Finality Instead of Fairness, 24
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 227, 229 (1986).
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that the trial court should consider evidence of bad faith conduct by
the non-settling defendants and decrease the required offset accord-
ingly.6 Further, the court announced that veto provisions in SSA's
that grant the settlor power over subsequent settlements with re-
maining defendants are valid only where the settlor would bear more
than its fair share of liability.
II. ABBOTT FORD'S SLIDING SCALE AGREEMENT
Following a mandatory settlement conference in the underlying
personal injury action, Abbott Ford's insurer and the plaintiffs nego-
tiated an SSA guaranteeing plaintiffs an ultimate recovery of $3 mil-
lion. In return, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their suit against
Abbott Ford and to continue zealous prosecution of their case against
the remaining defendants. 7 The agreement included a veto provision
enabling the insurer to reject any settlement with those defendants
for less than the guaranteed amount.
Under the agreement, the insurer made periodic no-interest loans
to plaintiffs. Further, the insurer agreed to loan the plaintiffs the
full $3 million if the action was not disposed of by July 1, 1987. The
plaintiffs were required to repay the loaned amounts if they collected
more than the guaranteed sum from the remaining defendants.
Should the agreement be adjudged invalid, the insurer was obligated
to pay the entire $3 million.
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The court employed a cautious approach in analyzing the applica-
bility of section 877 to SSA's.8 Since a wide variety of contractual
agreements fall within the general category of SSA's,9 the court ac-
knowledged that consideration of the particular factual setting and
stage of litigation was required. Therefore, the court determined that
a general analysis of SSA's was inappropriate, and confined its analy-
6. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West 1980); Wesierki, Mary Carter Agree-
ments and Good Faith Settlements-Are They Both Possible in California, 48 INS.
COUNS. J. 639, 647 (1981).
7. Initial defendants in the suit included Abbott Ford, Inc., Ford Motor Co.,
Sears, Roebuck & Co., and Ramsey Sneed. Sneed entered a separate settlement agree-
ment with the plaintiffs, which was not at issue in this case. See Abbott'Ford, 43 Cal.
3d at 867 n.6, 741 P.2d at 129 n.6, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 631 n.6.
8. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 870, 741 P.2d at 131, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
9. These provisions can mandate secrecy, restrict settlement with remaining de-
fendants, and provide various forms of financing for plaintiff's action. See id.; see also
5 N. LEVY, supra note 3.
sis to SSA provisions similar to Abbott Ford's.1O The court implied
that its reasoning here would not necessarily extend to every SSA.
A. Application of the Tech-Bilt Good Faith Standard
Sections 877 and 877.611 of the Civil Procedure Code have two
goals: 1) equitable cost-sharing among the parties at fault; and 2) en-
couragement of settlement.12 The court treated these goals as inex-
tricably linked through the good faith requirement.1 3 Conceding that
a precise definition of good faith was impracticable, the court utilized
the guideline set forth in Tech-Bilt: "whether the amount of the set-
tlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's pro-
portional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's
injuries."14
The court proclaimed that the Tech-Bilt standard of good faith sat-
isfied both statutory goals and, therefore, would achieve ultimate
fairness to non-settling defendants.15 In order to gain immunity from
contribution or comparative indemnity,16 the court insisted that par-
ties to an SSA settle within the Tech-Bilt ballpark.17 The offset pro-
vision 18 would then assure that the non-settling defendant's liability
would be fairly apportioned. Although perfect apportionment of lia-
bility is not required, the court emphasized that the settlement may
not be "grossly disproportionate" to the settlor's fair share.19
1. Equitable Cost-Sharing: Determining the Value of the
"Consideration Paid."
The court placed the burden on the settling parties to assess the
10. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 871, 741 P.2d at 132, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 634. Note that
prior to the court's consideration of the issues herein, the case was fully settled. How-
ever, the court asserted jurisdiction to resolve the "important issues of substantial and
public concern." Id. at 868 n.8, 741 P.2d at 130 n.8, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 632 n.8.
11. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1987).
12. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 872, 741 P.2d at 133, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 635; see 15A
AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 5 (1976 & Supp. 1987).
13. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 873, 741 P.2d at 133, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 635; see 15A
AM. JUR. 2D Compromise and Settlement § 16 (1976 & Supp. 1987); 12 CAL. JUR. 3D
Compromise, Settlement and Release § 97 (1974 & Supp. 1987); Comment, supra note 3,
at 846.
14. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 873, 741 P.2d at 134, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (citing
Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263) (emphasis in origi-
nal). The court identified several factors to consider in evaluating good faith, such as
the amount paid in settlement, the financial conditions of the defendant, and collusive
conduct. Id. at 874, 741 P.2d at 134, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 636; see also 5 N. LEVY, supra note
3, § 74.06(1)(b).
15. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 873, 741 P.2d at 134, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
16. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 877(b), 877.6(c) (West 1980 & Supp. 1987).
17. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 874, 741 P.2d at 134, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
18. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West 1980).
19. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 874, 741 P.2d at 134, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
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value of the "consideration paid" under the SSA.20 Surmising that
plaintiffs will seek low figures to reduce the value of the offset and
defendants will argue for high figures to be in Tech-Bilt's ballpark,
the court maintained that this joint valuation would generally pro-
duce a reasonable result.21
Following the joint valuation process, the burden then shifts to the
non-settlors to either: 1) accept the declared value and attempt to
show that it is not within the ballpark; or 2) attempt to prove the
value is too low and a greater reduction is warranted. 22 Once the
trial court decides the value is in the ballpark, this amount then
serves as the offset under section 877.23 Therefore, the ultimate
amount of the settlor's obligation to the plaintiff is the difference be-
tween the amount of total damages assessed against the non-settlors
(as reduced by the SSA's approved value) and the guaranteed
amount.2 4
2. Encouraging Full Settlements
The court asserted its prerogative to regulate SSA's in furtherance
of the state's interest in securing full settlements.25 In determining
good faith, the trial court should properly consider any bad faith con-
duct by the non-settlors and adjust the ballpark accordingly. Thus,
the trial court may reduce the lower end of the range and find a good
faith settlement, even though the value may otherwise be unaccept-
ably low. 26 The court cautioned that this sanction should not, how-
ever, be "unduly coercive." 27
B. Limitation of the Settlor's Veto Powers
Acknowledging the potential anti-settlement effect of SSA's, the
court limited the settlor's ability to veto subsequent settlements with
remaining defendants.2 8 Although veto provisions serve a legitimate
20. The "consideration" is that amount attributed to the settling defendant as the
payment for release from further liability. The SSA is given in exchange for the re-
lease. Id. at 878, 741 P.2d at 137, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
21. Id. at 879, 741 P.2d at 137, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
22. Id. at 879, 741 P.2d at 138, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
23. See supra note 18.
24. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 885 n.27, 741 P.2d at 142 n.27, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 644
n.27.
25. Id. at 880, 741 P.2d at 138, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
26. Id. at 882, 741 P.2d at 139, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
27. Id. at 882, 741 P.2d at 140, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
28. Veto provisions generally enable settlors to reject any subsequent settlements
for less than the guaranteed amount. Id. at 883, 741 P.2d at 140, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
interest by ensuring plaintiffs will diligently prosecute the remaining
claims,29 open-ended vetoes may discourage full settlement.30 The
court held that veto provisions must be confined to subsequent settle-
ments where the settlor might ultimately pay more than its fair
share. 31
Although not deciding whether the potential anti-settlement effect
may necessitate a finding of bad faith under sections 877 and 877.6,
the court offered guidance to litigants:32 settling parties can obviate
this result by providing that subsequent settlement proceeds be
shared with the earlier-settling defendants and the plaintiffs. This
would ensure that plaintiffs retain some incentive to entertain rea-
sonable offers from the remaining defendants. 33
IV. THE SEPARATE OPINIONS
A. Justice Broussard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Broussard took issue with the majority's view that non-set-
tlors could challenge the assigned value and seek a greater reduction
in the plaintiff's claim.34, He reasoned that this option would result
in mini-trials to establish the "proper" value, causing needless delays
in the pre-trial approval process. 35 Further, allowing additional cal-
culations to an acknowledged "rough approximation" served no valid
purpose once the assessed value falls within the ballpark.36 He con-
cluded with the concern that this approach would merely encourage
provisions voiding the SSA when the value was challenged.3 7
B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk disagreed with the majority's analysis of the good
faith requirement.38 He contended that section 877 requires only
that the plaintiff and the settlor refrain from collusive conduct in-
tended to prejudice the interests of the non-settling parties.39
Agreeing that SSA's are not inherently invalid, Justice Mosk ar-
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 884, 741 P.2d at 141, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 887, 741 P.2d at 143, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 645 (Broussard, J., concurring).
35. Id at 887, 741 P.2d at 143, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
36. Id. at 888, 741 P.2d at 144, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 646.
37. Id.
38. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Note that although Justice Mosk concurred in Tech-
Bilt, here he incorporates the argument that former Chief Justice Bird espoused in her
dissent to Tech-Bilt. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d 488, 502, 698 P.2d 159, 168, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256,
265 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
39. Abbott Ford, 43 Cal. 3d at 889, 741 P.2d at 144, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 646 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 15: 443, 1988] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
gued that section 877 was merely designed to encourage settlement.40
He noted that the purpose and intent of the section, as originally
drafted, did not extend to equitable cost-sharing.41 He observed that
section 877 only governs pre-judgment releases, whereas equitable
cost-sharing presupposes the parties have been adjudged liable.42
Justice Mosk asserted that the majority's expansion of the good
faith requirement would render SSA's more complex, discourage set-
tlement, and increase court congestion.43 He pointed out that this
broad construction of good faith conflicts with the common law by
imposing a duty on the settling parties to protect the adverse inter-
ests of the non-settlor.44 Consequently, the justice concluded that
the majority's analysis of the good faith requirement was fundamen-
tally unsound.
V. CONCLUSION
Building upon its decision in Tech-Bilt, the court has taken the
next logical step by decreeing that SSA's are not inherently invalid,
but rather should be judged on a case-by-case basis. Unfortunately,
the court leaves the litigant with only vague, ill-defined guidelines
for assessing the offset value of the SSA. With the reasonable range
test already amorphous, prospective settlors must now seek direc-
tions to the court's ballpark.
The court should provide litigants with reasonably clear guidelines
so that they may effectively negotiate final settlements. Neither
Tech-Bilt nor Abbott Ford accomplish this end. With such loose ter-
minology as "not unduly Coercive," "ballpark," "rough approxima-
tion," and "grossly disproportionate," the court has given neither the
bar nor the trial bench any legitimate guideline for evaluating SSA's.
Regrettably, Abbott Ford will merely spawn further litigation to
force some relief from the court's poor fielding of this issue.
BARBARA A. BAYLISS
40. Id. at 898, 741 P.2d at 150-51, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
41. Id. at 898-99, 741 P.2d at 15i, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
42. Id. at 900, 741 P.2d 'at 152, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 654.
43. Id. at 901, 741 P.2d 153, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
44. Id.
B. Dismissal for failure to bring a case to trial within
five years does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction
to award attorney fees. Plaintiffs who have conferred
a substantial benefit upon a large class of persons by
obtaining a preliminary injunction are successful
litigants under the private attorney general doctrine,
even though their underlying action is eventually
dismissed. Maria P. v. Riles.
In Maria P. v. Riles, 43 Cal. 3d 1281, 743 P.2d 932, 240 Cal. Rptr. 872
(1987), the California Supreme Court was asked to determine: 1)
whether dismissal under section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
for failure to bring a case to trial within five years, divested the trial
court of jurisdiction to award attorney fees; and 2) whether plaintiffs
who obtained a preliminary injunction preventing public schools
from reporting their students' immigration status to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, but whose underlying action was eventu-
ally dismissed, can be considered successful litigants under the pri-
vate attorney general doctrine. The court concluded that dismissal
pursuant to section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not divest
the trial court of jurisdiction to award attorney fees. Further, the
court found that plaintiffs were successful litigants under the private
attorney general doctrine because they conferred a substantial bene-
fit upon a large class of persons and the public at large by obtaining
the preliminary injunction.
In this case, an action was brought against a school district and the
state superintendent of public instruction. The plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction enjoining the district from refusing admission
to school on the basis of noncitizenship status, reporting status to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service as provided for by section
6957 of the Education Code, and implementing section 6957 in the
state. The preliminary injunction was granted. Subsequently, be-
cause of the repeal of the statutory reporting requirements, the plain-
tiffs did not prosecute the action further. Dismissal under section 583
of the Civil Procedure Code for failure to bring the case to trial
within five years resulted. The plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees
under section 1021.5 of the Civil Procedure Code, the private attor-
ney general doctrine.
Section 1021.5 of the Civil Procedure Code allows a court to award
attorney fees to a successful party in an action if that action has "re-
sult[ed] in the enforcement of an important right and confer[red] a
substantial benefit on the public." Id. at 1289, 743 P.2d at 935, 240
Cal. Rptr. at 876; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 1980); see also
7 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Judgment §§ 173-181 (3d ed.
1985 & Supp. 1987); 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Costs §§ 105-108 (rev. ed. 1983 &
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Supp. 1987). Thus, "section 1021.5 motions may not be heard 'until
the benefit is secure, in some cases after judgment is final.'" Maria
P., 43 Cal. 3d at 1289, 743 P.2d at 936, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (citing Fol-
som v. Butte County Ass'n of Gov'ts, 32 Cal. 3d 668, 679, 652 P.2d 437,
445, 186 Cal. Rptr. 589, 597 (1982); Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkeley, 181 Cal. App. 3d 213, 226-27, 226 Cal. Rptr. 265, 273
(1986)). An application for fees may be heard by the trial court after
the judgment in the action for which fees have been sought has be-
come final.
The defendants contended that section 583 is purely jurisdictional
and that a court has no authority to issue orders after a mandatory
dismissal. See, e.g., McDonough Power Equip. Co. v. Superior Court, 8
Cal. 3d 527, 530-31, 503 P.2d 1338, 1340-41, 105 Cal. Rptr. 330, 332-33
(1972); White v. Renck, 108 Cal. App. 3d 835, 840-41, 166 Cal. Rptr.
701, 704 (1980). The defendants also alleged that dismissal under sec-
tion 583 does not result in a judgment.
Since both this court and the California Legislature relied on fed-
eral cases in determining the adoption and scope of the private attor-
ney general doctrine, the court looked to the federal law in rejecting
the first of the defendants' arguments. Under article III, section 2 of
the United States Constitution, a federal court no longer has jurisdic-
tion when a case is dismissed for mootness. However, jurisdiction
continues to exist as to attorney fees. Martin v. Hedder, 773 F.2d
1145, 1148-49 (11th. Cir. 1985) (en banc); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d
845, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981); Bagby v.
Beal, 606 F.2d 411, 413-15 (3d Cir. 1979).
With regard to the second of the defendants' arguments, the court
stated that a section 583 dismissal resulted in a judgment. See CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 581(d) (West Supp. 1988). Thus, after dismissal
under section 583, the trial court retained jurisdiction to award attor-
ney fees under section 1021.5 of the Civil Procedure Code.
The court prefaced its discussion of the successful litigants issue
with well recognized principles of state law. First, attorney fees may
be awarded even though the action does not result in a final judg-
ment for the plaintiff. Westside Community for Indep. Living, Inc.
v. Obledo, 33 Cal. 3d 348, 352, 657 P.2d 365, 367, 188 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875
(1983); see also Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 34 Cal. 3d 311, 667 P.2d
704, 193 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1983). Second, a plaintiff's choice of enforce-
ment procedures does not affect entitlement to attorney fees under
section 1021.5. In re Head, 42 Cal. 3d 223, 228-29, 721 P.2d 65, 68, 228
Cal. Rptr. 184, 186-87 (1986). Third, a plaintiff who is successful on a
preliminary issue which is essentially dispositive of the case is not au-
tomatically prevented from obtaining fees. Woodland Hills Residents
Ass'n v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 938, 593 P.2d 200, 211, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 503, 514 (1979). Fourth, "[i]n determining whether a plaintiff is
a successful party for purposes of section 1021.5, 'the critical fact is
the impact of the action, not the manner of its resolution.'" Maria
P., 43 Cal. 3d at 1291, 743 P.2d at 937, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 877 (citing Fol-
som, 32 Cal. 3d at 685, 652 P.2d at 449, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 601). The
court noted that reversal of a fees award is warranted only if the
award constitutes a prejudicial abuse of discretion. Baggett v. Gates,
32 Cal. 3d 128, 142-43, 649 P.2d 874, 882, 185 Cal. Rptr. 232, 240 (1982);
see 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Costs § 106 (rev. ed. 1983 & Supp. 1987).
The supreme court and the trial court both recognized that the
plaintiffs gained a substantial benefit for the people of the state by
obtaining the injunction to prevent the operation of section 6957 of
the Education Code for almost three years. See 16 CAL. JUR. 3D Costs
§ 107 (rev. ed. 1983 & Supp. 1987). It was therefore irrelevant that
the amendment of section 6957 mooted the plaintiffs' case.
To award a fee under section 1021.5, a causal connection between
the plaintiffs' lawsuit and the relief obtained must exist. Westside
Community for Indep. Living, Inc., 33 Cal. 3d at 353, 657 P.2d at 367,
188 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The appropriate tests in determining the suc-
cessful party take into account: "'(a) the situation immediately prior
to the commencement of the suit, and (b) the situation today and the
role, if any, played by the litigation in effecting the change.'" Maria
P., 43 Cal. 3d at 1291, 743 P.2d at 937, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 878 (quoting
Folsom, 32 Cal. 3d at 685 n.31, 652 P.2d at 449 n.31, 186 Cal. Rptr. at
601 n.31) (citation omitted).
The court reasoned that these guidelines indicated that the plain-
tiffs should receive attorney fees. The plaintiffs sought to prohibit
school officials from reporting a student to the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service and to prevent enforcement of section 6957 of the
Education Code throughout the state. The preliminary injunction, ac-
complished both of these aims for almost three years. The fact that
section 6957 had not been previously enforced was of no consequence.
Following the preliminary injunction, the school districts could not
report a child's nonimmigration status to the federal authorities. But
for the plaintiffs' lawsuit, this result would not have been achieved.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs' action had served the pub-
lic interest by protecting the confidentiality of the school records as
well as the right to equal educational opportunities. The court found
that the interests served by the plaintiffs were those that the private
attorney general doctrine was created to encourage. See 16 CAL. JUR.
3D Costs § 108 (rev. ed. 1983 & Supp. 1987).
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The defendants further contended that the trial court's failure to
support its calculation of attorney fees required reversal of the
award. The court briefly stated that while the trial court should have
specified the basis of its award, its failure to do so did not require a
remand to redetermine the attorney fee award. Further, there was
no other record from which to assess error, if any error existed. The
court noted that the burden of providing an adequate record rests on
the party challenging the fee award on appeal. See In re Kathy P., 25
Cal. 3d 91, 102, 599 P.2d 65, 71, 157 Cal. Rptr. 874, 880 (1979).
In conclusion, the court's decision has opened the door even fur-
ther for the type of litigation that the private attorney general doc-
trine was intended to foster. Plaintiffs can be considered successful
litigants even after their cases have been dismissed for failure to
bring them to trial on time. All they must do is obtain a preliminary
injunction.
STAFF
VII. SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS LAW
A. A child molester, unrelated to his victim but a member
of the victim's household at the time of the offense, may
be eligible for probation rather than mandatory
sentencing: People v. Jeffers.
In People v. Jeffers, 43 Cal. 3d 984, 741 P.2d 1127, 239 Cal. Rptr. 886
(1987), the court determined that a defendant convicted of lewd and
lascivious acts with a child under fourteen years of age may avoid the
mandatory sentencing provisions of section 1203.066 of the Penal
Code [hereinafter section 1203.066], if he was a member of the vic-
tim's "household" at the time of the offense. See CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1203.066 (West Supp. 1987); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West
Supp. 1987). Further, the court expanded the class of persons consti-
tuting the victim's household to include nontraditional, quasi-familial
living arrangements.
Section 1203.066 proscribes mandatory prison terms for defendants
convicted of sexually abusing children. Subdivision (c) exempts a de-
fendant from such sentencing if: 1) the defendant is a parent, rela-
tive, or member of the victim's household and had lived in the
household; 2) imprisonment is not in the child's best interest; 3) reha-
bilitation of the defendant is feasible; and 4) there is no threat of
harm to the child if the defendant is not imprisoned. See generally 4
R. ERWIN, M. MILLMAN, K. MONROE, C. SEVILLA, & B. TARLOW, CAL-
IFORNIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 90.12(2)(f) (1987); 1 B.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, §§ 545-549 (1964 & Supp. 1985); 42 AM.
JUR. 2D Infants § 17.5 (Supp. 1987).
Here, the court was presented with a factual scenario wherein the
victim and her mother lived with the defendant and his family spo-
radically over a period of years. The defendant eventually became a
father figure to the child, ultimately molesting her. Thus, the court
analyzed whether such a defendant would meet the requirements of
section 1203.066(c)(1).
The court first noted that section 1203.066(c)(1) ambiguously re-
quires that the defendant be a "member of the household," and also
that the defendant "has lived" with the victim. The court reasoned
that members of the household constitute a class broader than those
who have lived with the victim. Consequently, the court expanded
the meaning of household member to encompass bonds with unre-
lated persons in nontraditional living arrangements.
The court next examined the legislative history to resolve the am-
biguity created by the use of past and present time frames in section
1203.066(c)(1). See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes §§ 300-301 (1974 & Supp.
1987); 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Statutes §§ 100-103 (1980). In order to exclude
neighbors, teachers, and others from the broad class of household
members, the legislature imposed a requirement that the offender
must actually live with the victim. The court found that the legisla-
ture was also concerned about the child's subsequent emotional well-
being, and the prospects for rehabilitating the intrafamily offender.
Based on these concerns, the court concluded that section
1203.066(c)(1) requires a defendant to be a member of the victim's
household at the time of the offense, rather than at the time of sen-
tencing. To conclude otherwise would encourage the defendant to
maintain a close relationship with the victim after the offense, when
a severing of the relationship may be more desirable. The court re-
manded this case to the trial court for further consideration.
The court's decision effectively broadens the class of child molest-
ers eligible for probation to those in nontraditional family settings.
Adequate statutory safeguards should prevent nondeserving defend-
ants from reaping the benefits of this decision. For example, a court
must establish on psychiatric evidence that rehabilitation of the of-
fender is feasible-an unlikely possibility where the offender is a
pedophile, rather than an intrafamily offender. Further, the court
must find that imprisonment of the offender is not in the child's best
interests. This allows a court to properly consider such essential fac-
tors as the family's economic and emotional well-being, the child's
guilt feelings, and future harm to the child. See generally 6 R. ER-
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WIN, M. MILLMAN, K. MONROE, C. SEVILLA, & B. TARLOW, CALIFOR-
NIA CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 144.10(2) (1987); 21 AM. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law §§ 567-570 (1981 & Supp. 1987); 17 CAL. JUR. 3D, pt. 2,
Criminal Law, §§ 771-819 (rev. ed. 1984 & Supp. 1987).
BARBARA A. BAYLISS
B. Section 1732.5 of the We fare and Institutions Code
only precludes commitment to the Youth Authority
for offenders with current convictions for serious
felonies: People v. Woodhead.
In People v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 741 P.2d 154, 239 Cal. Rptr.
656 (1987), the California Supreme Court determined that section
1732.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code [hereinafter section
1732.5] does not prevent persons eighteen years of age or older con-
victed of a "nonserious" felony from commitment to the Youth Au-
thority in certain circumstances. Even though an individual may
have a prior conviction for a "serious" felony, section 1732.5 only pre-
cludes commitment of one eighteen years of age or older to the
Youth Authority if the current conviction is for a serious felony.
The nineteen year old defendant had pleaded no contest to second
degree burglary and had admitted a prior conviction of first degree
burglary. The trial court found him guilty of second degree burglary
and sentenced him to the Youth Authority. The Youth Authority re-
jected the defendant as ineligible for commitment under section
1732.5.
The court held that the language of section 1732.5 was ambiguous
since the phrase "no person convicted of" could reasonably be inter-
preted to refer to current convictions of serious felonies, or it could
be construed to include prior convictions.
The court relied upon general principles of statutory construction
in forming the interpretation of an ambiguous statutory phrase, and
looked to other statutes applicable to similar subjects. See generally
1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES § 18 (Supp. 1985). The court then
analyzed section 1203.06 of the Penal Code [hereinafter section
1203.06], regarding restrictions with respect to the granting of proba-
tion. Subdivision (a)(2) of section 1203.06 expressly distinguishes per-
sons who have been "previously convicted" of serious felonies from
those who have been "convicted." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.06(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1987). Therefore, the word "convicted" in a statute,
unadorned by a modifier such as "previously," refers to a current
conviction.
Since section 1203.06 was enacted as part of Proposition 8, the court
analyzed other sections of Proposition 8 in conjunction with it in or-
der to arrive at a harmonious result. See People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal.
3d 301, 307, 605 P.2d 859, 864, 162 Cal. Rptr. 30, 34 (1980); People ex
rel. Younger v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 30, 40, 544 P.2d 1322, 1328,
127 Cal. Rptr. 122, 128 (1976); 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, § 18
(1964). Proposition 8 resulted in the addition of section 667 to the Pe-
nal Code [hereinafter section 667]. Section 667 expressly differenti-
ates persons "who previously have been convicted of a serious
felony" from persons "convicted" of serious felonies. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). The court con-
cluded that section 667 used the word "convicted" to refer to current
convictions. Therefore, the court reasoned that consistency required
that the reference in section 1732.5 to persons "convicted" of serious
felonies must be construed to refer exclusively to persons currently
convicted of serious felonies. Finally, the court found that section
1732.5 did not affect the trial court's sentencing discretion.
This opinion illustrates a routine procedure on the part of state
supreme courts-statutory construction. The holding further estab-
lishes that the court is willing to construe ambiguities in penal stat-
utes most favorably to the accused.
STAFF
VIII. TORT LAW
A licensed real estate broker cannot invoke the doctrine
of equitable estoppel against a statute of frauds defense
in an action to recover a commission unless actual fraud
is proven: Phillippe v. Shapell Industries, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Phillippe v. Shapell Industries, Inc.,' the court held that a li-
censed real estate broker cannot invoke the doctrine of equitable es-
toppel to enforce a commission agreement that failed to adhere to the
statute of frauds. Section 1624(d) of the Civil Code2 expressly pro-
vides that a commission agreement between a real estate broker and
1. 43 Cal. 3d 1247, 743 P.2d 1279, 241 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1987). Justice Eagleson wrote
the majority opinion with Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Arguelles, Roth, and
Woods concurring. Justice Kaufman authored a separate dissenting opinion in which
Justice Broussard concurred. Justices Roth and Woods were assigned by the Chairper-
son of the Judicial Counsel.
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(d) (West Supp. 1988).
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a purchaser of land must be memorialized in writing.3 Under Cali-
fornia law, licensed brokers are required to have completed specific
courses pertaining to the legal aspects of real estate transactions.4
The court, therefore, concluded that since the plaintiff was a licensed
broker and knew or should have known the statutory requirements
for commission agreements, he could not rely on the equitable rem-
edy of estoppel to avoid his failure to enter into a valid written
contract.5
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
The plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker,6 was the listing agent
for a large tract of land which was purchased by the defendant,
Shapell Industries, Inc. Subsequent to this transaction, Shapell's di-
rector of land acquisition, Prince, approached Phillippe with a propo-
sition whereby Phillippe would locate suitable tracts of land for
Shapell in the Palos Verdes Peninsula. Phillippe accepted the offer
on the condition that Shapell, as buyer, would be responsible for pay-
ment of his commission.
The first contemplated sale of land under this arrangement was
unsuccessful. However, pursuant to the transaction each party wrote
a letter recognizing the terms agreed to orally. A letter from Phil-
lippe to Prince dated April 5, 1973 stated: "We present the property
to Shapell with the understanding that Buyer will pay our firm a
commission, which, when added to the net price of the land, will
equal 6% of the total consideration." 7 About a month later Prince
wrote a letter to Phillippe acknowledging that: "/b]uyer agrees to
pay the Management Trend Company [Phillippe's firm] a commis-
3. Section 1624(d) of the Civil Code provides in pertinent part:
The following contracts are invalid unless they, or some note or memorandum
,thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the
party's agent:
(d) An agreement authorizing or employing an agent, broker or any other per-
son to purchase or sell real estate ... or to procure, introduce, or find a pur-
chaser or seller of real estate ... for compensation of commission.
Id. (emphasis in original).
4. See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10170.5 (West 1987) (requirements for
renewal of brokers license and mandatory broker education courses).
5. Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1252, 743 P.2d at 1280, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
6. The court limited the applicability of its holding to licensed brokers because of
the stringent statutory requirements they must complete for certification. See infra
notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
7. Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1253, 743 P.2d at 1280, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (emphasis
added).
sion [which] when added to the net price of the land will equal 6% of
the total consideration."8
Despite the initial failure, Phillippe continued to search for suita-
ble tracts and located a ninety-four acre parcel then owned by Great
Lakes Properties, Inc., which is the subject of this litigation. Phil-
lippe, in a letter identifying this tract, again expressly reiterated that
the properties were presented with the understanding that Shapell
would be responsible for Phillippe's commission if a sale was consum-
mated. Shapell neither responded in writing to the above letter nor
acknowledged formally that the commission arrangement outlined
was agreeable to it.
Initially, the Great Lakes tract was rejected by Shapell because the
zoning requirements were incompatible with the corporate plans.
Shortly thereafter, however, the land was rezoned and in late 1975
Shapell became interested in acquiring sixty-three acres that were
still available. In the interim, Joseph Aaron, a Shapell vice presi-
dent, became involved in the Palos Verdes land acquisition project.
In April 1974, Phillippe sent Aaron a letter which again mentioned
the commission arrangement contained in the August 9 letter. Aaron
never replied.
Pursuant to Shapell's interest in acquiring the Palos Verdes tract,
Aaron negotiated directly with Great Lakes. A purchase and sale
agreement was signed for the sixty-three acre tract. This agreement
did not contain a commission provision for Phillippe.
After his request for compensation in accordance with the commis-
sion arrangement was formally denied by Shapell, Phillippe brought
the present action. Phillippe sought recovery of a six percent com-
mission on the theory that there was sufficient evidence of a written
agreement to satisfy the statute of frauds or, in the alternative, to in-
voke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to preclude Shapell from as-
serting the statute of frauds as a defense. 9 The jury found by special
verdict for Phillippe on a theory of equitable estoppell 0 and awarded
him $125,000.11
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority addressed three issues raised 'on appeal. First, it dis-
8. Id. (emphasis added).
9. Phillippe also sought to recover on the theory that he was entitled to a six per-
cent finder's fee. Further, he claimed that he was entitled to recover a six percent
commission based upon an alleged agreement between himself and Shapell that they
would share a broker's commission. The trial court rejected both of these claims and
the issues were not addressed by the court on appeal. Id. at 1254-55, 743 P.2d at 1281,
241 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
10. Id. at 1258 n.7, 743 P.2d at 1284 n.7, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 27 n.7.
11. Id. at 1254, 743 P.2d at 1281, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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cussed whether the commission agreement was subject to the statute
of frauds. Second, it analyzed whether the correspondence between
the two parties was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section
1624(d) of the Civil Code.12 Finally, the court examined the doctrine
of equitable estoppel and various public policy considerations in de-
termining whether a licensed real estate broker should be permitted
to invoke the doctrine to successfully prevent a principal from assert-
ing the statute of frauds as a defense.
Phillippe contended that the commission agreement entered into
between himself and Shapell was not subject to the requirements of
section 1624(d). Section 1624(d) expressly states that an agreement
authorizing or employing a broker for the purchase or sale of real es-
tate must be in writing.1 3 Phillippe argued that he was not acting as
a broker in the Great Lakes transaction but rather as " 'a profes-
sional consultant in the field of subdivision management.' "14 He,
therefore, contended that he should be permitted to recover the stip-
ulated commission for services rendered on a theory of quantum me-
ruit. 15 The court found that the overwhelming weight of the
evidence clearly indicated that Phillippe was acting as a broker in the
transaction. In particular, the court focused on the correspondence
Phillippe sent to Shapell identifiying himself and his firm as brokers,
and stating that they expected to be paid a brokerage commission. 16
Phillippe also argued that section 1624(d) was not applicable to
transactions between two brokers. The majority dismissed this claim
as having no merit, holding that the primary purpose of the statute is
protection of all purchasers and sellers of land from false claims
made by a broker.17 The fact that Shapell was also a licensed broker
did not preclude it from the protection of section 1624(d).18
12. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(d) (West Supp. 1988).
13. Id.
14. Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1255, 743 P.2d at 1282, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (citation
omitted by court).
15. See Owen v. National Container Corp. of California, 115 Cal. App. 2d 21, 251
P.2d 765 (1952). In Owen, the California Supreme Court stated that a broker could
enter into a valid oral agreement where his duties would be to locate a suitable site
without "any duty on his part to bring the parties together or to negotiate or assist in a
purchase." Id. at 26, 251 P.2d at 768.
16. A letter from Phillippe to Aaron, dated June 9, 1976, stated: "[O]ur firm was
working for and represent[ing] Shapell, the buyer, as brokers and would be paid a bro-
kerage commission from buyer .. " Phillippe, 43 Cal.3d at 1256, 743 P.2d at 1282, 241
Cal. Rptr. at 25 (emphasis in original).
17. Id. at 1257, 743 P.2d at 1283, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
18. At the present time, approximately two percent of California's populace holds
a real estate license. If the court were to recognize Phillippe's assertion, then a rela-
The court then discussed whether the commission agreement met
the requirements of section 1624(d). Section 1624(d) expressly re-
quires that a broker's commission agreement be "in writing and sub-
scribed by the party to be charged. ... 9 Although both parties
exchanged various correspondence during the course of their busi-
ness relationship, the only letter in which Shapell acknowledged re-
sponsibility for payment of a commission, explicitly specified the
Filorum property which was never purchased. The majority cited
Frederick v. Cartright2° for the proposition that "[w]here a broker's
only agreement with his principal relates solely to specifically de-
scribed property, the principal is not liable to the broker for a com-
mission on the purchase of different property.. "21 The court
concluded that since there was not a specific written commission
agreement pertaining to the purchase of the Great Lakes tract, the
requirements of section 1624(d) were not satisfied.22
Phillippe, relying on the court's holding in Monarco v. Lo Greco, 3
argued that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be invoked to
enforce the commission arrangement orally agreed to by Shapell.
The equitable remedy of estoppel can be successfully asserted to en-
force an oral agreement where either 1) a party has relied upon the
oral representation and has changed its position to the extent that
unconscionable injury would be suffered; or 2) a party has accepted
the benefits of the agreement and would be unjustly enriched. 24 Af-
ter reviewing the facts of the case, the majority held that estoppel
was not applicable. 25 The majority relied on precedents noting that
California courts have consistently prohibited a licensed broker from
asserting estoppel to recover a commission where an oral agreement
was never reduced to writing.2 6 The majority also examined the
tively significant portion of the state's population would be deprived from the statute's
protection. Id. at 1257 n.4, 743 P.2d at 1283 n.4, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 26 n.4.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(d) (West Supp. 1988).
20. 137 Cal. App. 2d 610, 290 P.2d 875 (1955).
21. Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1259, 743 P.2d at 1284, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (citing Fred-
erick v. Curtright, 137 Cal. App. 2d 610, 614, 290 P.2d 875, 878 (1955)).
22. Id.
23. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950) (en banc) (husband and wife orally promised
their stepson that he would inherit the bulk of their estate if he continued to work in
the family venture).
24. Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1259, 743 P.2d at 1284-85, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28. See
generally 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 322-325 (9th ed.
1987); 35 CAL. JUR. 3D Statute of Frauds §§ 109-111 (1977).
25. Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1259, 743 P.2d at 1285, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
26. Id. The court noted two circumstances where a broker was permitted to assert
equitable estoppel to recover on an oral commission agreement. In Le Blond v. Wolfe,
83 Cal. App. 2d 282, 188 P.2d 278 (1948), the real estate broker cancelled a valid com-
mission agreement with the sellers in reliance on the buyer's oral promise to pay the
commission. Id. at 286-87, 188 P.2d at 280-81. In Owens v. Foundation for Ocean Re-
search, 107 C6l. App. 3d 179, 165 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1980), the principal in the transaction
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holding in the recent case of Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc.,27 where the
court permitted an unlicensed real estate finder to invoke the doc-
trine of estoppel to recover a finder's fee pursuant to an oral agree-
ment.28 In this instance, however, the court refused to extend the
Tenzer decision to licensed brokers. The primary reason was that li-
censed brokers, as part of their certification, are required to have
knowledge of the laws relating to real estate transactions.29 Phillippe
assumed the risk that his efforts might go unrewarded because he
failed to comply with the legal requirements applicable to commis-
sion agreements, of which he is presumed to be cognizant.30
The majority also analyzed the two bases for permitting a claim of
equitable estoppel and found neither reliance by Phillippe on the oral
agreement nor unjust enrichment of Shapell. Because section
1624(d) requires that a commission agreement be in writing, the
court held that it was not reasonable for Phillippe, a licensed broker,
to rely on an invalid agreement. 3' Further, the court found that
Shapell's non-payment for Phillippe's services did not constitute un-
just enrichment.32 Therefore, the court held that Phillippe could not
invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the present case.33
IV. JUSTICE KAUFMAN'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Kaufman rejected the majority's broad holding that regard-
less of the specific facts or circumstances of the case, a licensed bro-
ker cannot invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to avoid the
statute of frauds. The justice cited the recent case of Asdourian v.
specifically told the broker that his authorization was in writing when in fact it was
not. Id. at 183, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
27. 39 Cal. 3d 18, 702 P.2d 212, 216 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1985).
28. Id. at 28, 702 P.2d at 217-18, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 135. See generally 1 B. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 327 (9th ed. 1987).
29. Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1260, 743 P.2d at 1285, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 28. See gener-
ally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10150, 10153 (West 1987). Currently, in order to ob-
tain an original license, an applicant must complete a course in the legal aspects of real
estate at an accredited institution. Id. § 10153.2(a). To renew a license, a broker has to
complete a professional education course in which the legal aspects of real estate are
included. Id. § 10170.5. Because the legislature has enacted these stringent require-
ments, a licensed broker is presumed to have knowledge of the language of section
1624(d). Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1261-62, 1279 P.2d at 1285, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
30. Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1261, 1279 P.2d at 1285, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
31. Id. at 1263, 1279 P.2d at 1287, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
32. Id.
33. The majority did recognize that in cases where actual fraud is established a li-
censed broker will be permitted to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id. at
1270, 743 P.2d at 1292, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
Araj34 for the proposition that an oral contract is enforceable,
notwithstanding statutory provisions which specifically require that
the contract be in writing.35 He contended that the court should not
categorically prohibit the use of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
any particular class of contracts within the statute of frauds.3 6
Rather, Justice Kaufman believed that the court should consider the
policies underlying the statute of frauds, "in light of the equitable in-
terest of the plaintiff and the economic realities of the particular
transaction," to determine whether estoppel would be an appropriate
remedy in the particular transaction.37
Justice Kaufman would have permitted Phillippe to invoke the
doctrine of equitable estoppel for three reasons. First, the policy con-
siderations of the statute of frauds would not have been impaired be-
cause the principal, Shapell, was sophisticated in real estate
transactions and exercised great economic leverage over Phillippe.38
Second, the facts indicate that Phillippe relied on the oral agreement
in deciding to accept Shapell's offer to locate suitable tracts in the Pa-
los Verdes Peninsula.39 In addition, there would be an unconsciona-
ble injury if the commission agreement was not enforced because
Phillippe would not be compensated for his services.40 Finally,
Shapell had benefited from Phillippe's performance in that it ac-
quired the desired property and would be unjustly enriched if the
agreement was not enforced because they would not have to pay a
brokerage fee on the transaction.41
V. CONCLUSION
By not permitting a licensed real estate broker to invoke the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds, the court
demonstrated its unwillingness to judicially abrogate the legislature's
intent in enacting section 1624(d). The policy considerations underly-
ing the statute of frauds, which primarily include protecting the con-
sumer from false claims, are best served by not permitting exceptions
to the statute. The decision also demonstrates that the court will not
34. 38 Cal. 3d 276, 696 P.2d 95, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1985).
35. Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1275, 743 P.2d at 1296, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting) (citing Asdourian v. Araj, 38 Cal. 3d 276, 291-92, 696 P.2d 95, 105, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 203, 212-13 (1985)). In Asdourian, the contract in question pertained to home im-
provements which must comply with section 7159 of the Business and Professions
Code, requiring that "[elvery home improvement contract... shall be evidenced by a
writing .. " CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7159 (West 1975).
36. Phillippe, 43 Cal. 3d at 1273, 743 P.2d at 1297, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 1275, 743 P.2d at 1296, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
38. Id. at 1279-80, 743 P.2d at 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
39. Id. at 1280, 743 P.2d at 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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sympathize with a licensed broker who fails to adhere to the statute
of frauds. Licensed brokers are required by law to be educated in the
legal aspects of real estate transactions. The court will not permit a
broker to maintain an equitable cause of action when the broker has
failed to comply with the statutory requirements.
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